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Abstract
Expenditures for health care and health insurance have increased rapidly over the last several
decades. This thesis is composed of three essays that analyze markets for health care and
health insurance, respectively.
Chapter 1 studies risk selection between public and private health insurance when some, but
not all, individuals can opt out of otherwise mandatory public insurance. Using a theoretical
model, I show that public insurance is adversely selected when insurers and insureds are sym-
metrically informed about health-related risks, and that there can be adverse or advantageous
selection when insureds are privately informed. Using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel, I find that: (1) public insurance is, on balance, adversely selected under the German
public health insurance with opt-out scheme, (2) individuals advantageously select public in-
surance based on risk aversion and residential location, and (3) there is suggestive evidence
of asymmetric information in the market for private health insurance.
Chapter 2 investigates whether doctors prescribe antibiotics to protect themselves against po-
tential malpractice claims. Using data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey on
more than half a million outpatient visits between 1993 and 2011, I find that doctors are 6%
less likely to prescribe antibiotics after the introduction of a cap on noneconomic damages.
Over 140 million discharge records from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample do not reveal a
corresponding change in hospital stays for conditions that can potentially be avoided through
antibiotic use in the outpatient setting. These findings, as well as a stylized model of antibi-
otic prescribing under the threat of malpractice, suggest that liability-reducing tort reforms
can decrease the amount of antibiotics that are inappropriately prescribed for defensive rea-
sons.
Chapter 3 tests whether tort reforms induce physicians to adjust the amount of time spent
with patients. Analyzing data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey on more
than half a million physician office visits between 1993 and 2011, I find that three of the
most common tort reforms – caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, and
reforms of the joint-and-several liability rule – have no impact on length of ambulatory care
visits. I discuss potential explanations for this finding.
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1 Risk Selection under Public Health Insurance with Opt-
out
1.1 Introduction
Both mandatory public health insurance and freely competitive markets for private health
insurance have their disadvantages. Public health insurance typically does not leave much
room for consumer choice and often involves a one-size-fits-all policy. Facing inadequate
coverage in public insurance, many individuals turn to private insurers and end up holding
two health insurance policies.1 With a freely competitive market for private health insurance,
on the other hand, there may be too little pooling of risks and insufficient access to health
insurance from a social point of view. Access to health insurance can become severely limited
in the presence of asymmetric information, which may manifest itself in contracts with too
little coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) or in a complete break down of some segments
of the insurance market (Akerlof 1970, Hendren 2013).
Parallel public and private health insurance systems can overcome these drawbacks to
some extent. However, whenever private insurers compete with a public option, there is
the concern that the former are able to cream skim the best risks, leaving the public option
adversely selected. In this paper, I study risk selection between public and private health
insurance in Germany. The German health insurance system is an interesting case to consider
as it allows only a part of the population to choose between public and private insurance,
where those who choose private insurance do not contribute towards financing the public
plan. This system, which I will refer to as public health insurance with opt-out, guarantees a
certain degree of risk pooling in public insurance, at the expense of restricting the choice of
some individuals.2
I begin the analysis by constructing a theoretical model in which a single public plan that
is financed by risk-unrelated contributions coexists along with a market for private health
insurance in which insurers compete à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). The purpose of the
model is twofold. First, it shows that private insurers are not always able to cream skim the
best risks out of the pool of individuals who can choose to become privately insured, even
though private insurers have full flexibility in tailoring their contracts to attract good risks.
Instead, the model predicts that selection depends on the informational scenario. Under sym-
metric information, selection against the public plan is adverse: those who are eligible to opt
out and high risk stay in public insurance, because they profit from the implicit subsidies they
1For example, 44.9% of Australians, 15.6% of Italians, and 10% of the British hold private health insurance,
although all of these countries provide universal healthcare (Colombo and Tapay 2004). Many of these private
policies are duplicative, i.e., they include services which are already covered by universal insurance.
2While peculiar, Germany is not the only country with such a health insurance system; Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, and Peru have similar arrangements.
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receive from pooling with those who cannot opt out, while those who are eligible to opt out
and low risk buy private insurance. Under asymmetric information, there can be adverse or
advantageous selection into public insurance. The public plan can be advantageously selected
because private insurers offer contracts with varying degrees of coverage in order to screen
different risk types. This can lead to a situation in which relatively healthy individuals, who
are offered a contract with little coverage in private insurance, stay in public insurance, be-
cause they dislike the risk that comes with the private contract, whereas some relatively sick
individuals, who are offered a private contract with generous coverage, choose private insur-
ance. The second purpose of the model is that it suggests a test of asymmetric information,
which differs from the positive correlation test of Chiappori and Salanié (2000).
Drawing on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), I seek to answer the
following three questions empirically: What is the nature of selection between public and
private health insurance? What are the sources of selection? Is there asymmetric information
in the market for private health insurance?
Selection will be captured by the correlation between health insurance choice (public or
private) and subsequent healthcare use. To overcome the well-known issue that this corre-
lation can reflect both moral hazard and selection, I measure healthcare use with hospitali-
sations. Since several studies have shown that there is no incentive effect of private health
insurance coverage on hospitalisations in Germany, we can attribute the correlation between
health insurance choice and hospitalisations entirely to selection. Using 14 years of data from
the SOEP, I find a negative correlation between the choice to opt out of public insurance
and future hospitalisations. This correlation indicates adverse selection into public insurance,
which, to some extent, is expected since private health insurance premiums are based on in-
dividual risks and public health insurance contributions are not. I then decompose selection
into a part that is due to observable characteristics of insureds which affect the relative price
between public and private insurance and a part that is due other factors. Results suggest
that differences in the relative price between public and private insurance explain at least
one-third of the adverse selection into public insurance.
To study the sources of selection, I follow Finkelstein and Poterba (2014) and search for
unused observables that are correlated with both health insurance choice and healthcare use
after controlling for observables, where unused observables are variables that are observed
by the econometrician but which insurers do not use to calculate premiums. I find three
unused observables that qualify as sources of selection: self-assessed health, risk aversion,
and residential location. The former gives rise to adverse selection and the latter two give rise
to advantageous selection into public insurance.
I test for asymmetric information exploiting the predictions of the theoretical model and
find evidence in favour of it: the decision to opt out of public insurance is nonmonotone in
self-assessed health, a scenario which can only arise under asymmetric information accord-
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ing to the theoretical model. However, the evidence for asymmetric information should be
taken as merely suggestive, because the coefficients that reveal the nonmonotone pattern are
imprecisely estimated due to a lack of statistical power.
This paper is related to several distinct literatures. The theoretical model relates closely to
Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2013), who incorporate a public insurance plan into the canon-
ical model of a competitive health insurance market due to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
The main difference between their model and the model presented in this paper lies in the
financing of the public plan: Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2013) consider a tax-financed
public plan, whereas I study a budget-balanced, contribution-financed public plan. The latter
differs from the former in two important aspects. First, public insurance has a price attached
to it, which does not have to be paid if an individual decides to opt out. Second, the price
of public insurance is endogenously determined, by the characteristics of those who choose
public insurance.
This paper moreover contributes to the literature on selection between a public option and
competing private health insurance plans. One focus of this literature has been on selection
between traditional fee-for-service Medicare and private Medicare Advantage plans (Brown
et al. 2014, Newhouse et al. 2012, Newhouse et al. 2015). Recently, several empirical papers
have focused on the German health insurance system. Grunow and Nuscheler (2014) study
switches between public and private health insurance and find that individuals who have ex-
perienced a negative health shock exhibit an increased propensity to switch from private to
public insurance. Bünnings and Tauchmann (2015) investigate the decision to opt out of pub-
lic insurance and find that young and healthy individuals are disproportionately more likely
to opt out. These two studies, while suggestive of adverse selection into public insurance, do
not relate health insurance choice to subsequent healthcare utilization. In concurrent work,
Polyakova (2014) uses a regression discontinuity design and concludes that private insurers
are not successful at cream skimming the best risks, which she explains with heterogeneous
tastes for convenience and the long-term nature of private health insurance contracts. The
present paper offers a theoretical explanation why private insurers are not always able to
cream skim the best risks.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on testing for asymmetric information
in insurance markets, which is surveyed by Cohen and Siegelman (2010) and Einav et al.
(2010). The paper follows Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2013) and de la Mata et al. (2015)
in measuring healthcare use with hospitalisations when testing for asymmetric information.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 lays out the theoretical model.
Section 1.3 summarises the German health insurance system. Section 1.4 describes the data.
Section 1.5 explains the empirical approach. Section 1.6 reports the empirical results. Section
1.7 discusses policy implications and concludes. All proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
11
1.2 A Model of Public Health Insurance with Opt-out
This section introduces a model of public health insurance with opt-out. The model is geared
towards the German health insurance system, which features income-dependent contributions
to public insurance, a budget-balanced public plan, an opt-out policy that is based on income,
and risk rating in private insurance. As in Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2013), a public
insurance plan coexists along with a market for private insurance à la Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976). Individuals must choose exactly one insurance plan. The model describes the market
for health insurance within a risk class, in which individuals are observationally equivalent
except for the two features described below.
There is a measure one of individuals who differ along two dimensions: their probability of
becoming sick and their income. There are n   2 different risks, 0 < p1 < . . . < pn < 1, where
pi is the probability with which an illness occurs. Under symmetric information, a consumer’s
probability of falling sick is publicly observable, whereas it is private to the consumer under
asymmetric information. In case of falling sick, individuals suffer a monetary loss, d, against
which they can insure themselves. There are two levels of income, yL and yH , which are
publicly observable and satisfy yH > yL > d. The right to opt out of public insurance is granted
based on income. Individuals who earn the low income, yL, are mandatorily insured in public
insurance, while individuals who earn the high income, yH , can stay in public insurance or
opt out, buying private insurance instead.
Low-income earners play only a subordinated role since they do not choose their insur-
ance contract. They are completely characterized by three parameters: their fraction of the
population,  L, their income, yL, and their average risk, pL, where p1  pL  pn. High-income
earners, on the other hand, make an active choice between public and private insurance. The
fraction of high-income earners who is of risk pi is denoted by  i, where  i > 0. The fraction
of high-income earners in the population is given by
Pn
i=1  i = 1   L. Henceforth, I refer to
an individual with risk pi and income yH as a type pi.
An insurance contract is a vector I = (↵,  ), where ↵ is the insurance premium and  ,
1       0, is the co-insurance rate, i.e., the fraction of the damage which the insurer does not
cover. Expected utility of type pi holding insurance policy I = (↵,  ) is given by
U (I, pi) = piu (yH    d  ↵) + (1  pi)u (yH   ↵) ,
where u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable.
The public insurance plan, Ipub = (⌧y, ⌘), is announced at the outset and constitutes a
committed offer. It consists of a contribution rate, ⌧ , which multiplied by the income yields
the insurance premium, and a co-insurance rate, ⌘, which is the fraction of the damage that
will be not be covered by public insurance. Public health insurance entails two forms of
redistribution: from the rich to the poor, as premiums increase with income, and from the
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healthy to the sick, as premiums do not depend on risk. Public insurance is financed through
the contributions of its members. To maintain a balanced budget, the government must set
the contribution and co-insurance rates such that revenues equal expected cost:
⌧
 
 LyL +
nX
i=1
 is (pi) yH
!
= (1  ⌘) d
 
 LpL +
nX
i=1
 is (pi) pi
!
, (1.1)
where s(pi) equals one (zero) if type pi joins public insurance (private insurance). Note that
all individuals who can choose between public and private health insurance pay the same
premium for public insurance: ⌧yH .
After the public plan is announced, m   2 private insurers simultaneously offer contracts.
Private insurers are risk neutral, incur no administrative cost, and expect the following profit
from selling the contract I = (↵,  ) to an individual with risk pi:
⇡(I, pi) = ↵  pi (1   ) d.
Observing the menu of insurance plans available to them, high-income earners maximise
their expected utility by choosing between public insurance and the best private contract
which is available to them. The following tie-breaking assumption is made to avoid the inde-
terminacy of the equilibrium strategy profile that arises in the knife-edge case in which one
type is indifferent between public and private insurance.
Assumption 1. A high-income earner who is indifferent between public insurance and the best
available private insurance contract chooses public insurance.
Equilibrium of the health insurance market is defined as follows.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a strategy profile s⇤ = [s⇤(pi)]i2{1,...,n} and a set of contracts
C⇤, which includes the public plan, such that:
1. Every contract in C⇤ is selected by some consumer.
2. No contract in C⇤ yields negative profits.
3. There is no single contract outside of C⇤ that, if offered, will be selected by consumers
and will generate nonnegative profits for the insurer.
4. For i 2 {1, . . . , n}: s⇤(pi) = 1 if Ipub 2 argmaxI2C⇤ U(I, pi), and s⇤(pi) = 0 otherwise.
5. The government budget is balanced: equation (1.1) holds for s = s⇤.
The first three conditions are adapted from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). The fourth condi-
tion requires high-income earners to decide optimally between public and private insurance,
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incorporating the tie-breaking rule posited in Assumption 1. The fifth condition guarantees
that the public budget is balanced in equilibrium. In light of the fact that the majority of
high-income earners in Germany stay in public insurance, I consider only equilibria in which
at least some high-income earners choose public insurance.
Following Einav et al. (2010), I say that the public plan is adversely selected if the expected
cost of insuring the high-income earners who choose public insurance in equilibrium is higher
than the expected cost of insuring the population of high-income earners.
Definition 2. Ipub is adversely selected if Ep[pd | s⇤(p) = 1] > Ep[pd].
Conversely, I say that there is advantageous selection into public insurance if the reverse
inequality holds. Note that the low-income earners do not enter in the definition of selection.
This means that there is adverse selection into public insurance if and only if private insurers
are able to cream skim the best risks out of the pool of individuals who are allowed to opt out
of public insurance.
1.2.1 Equilibrium under Symmetric Information
Consider first the market for private health insurance. Under symmetric information, private
insurers know the risk of each applicant and can offer a corresponding contract. Following
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), competition drives insurance companies to offer n actuarially
fair contracts, one for each type, where each contract offers full insurance.
When deciding between public and private health insurance, the high-income earners take
into account two factors: co-insurance rates and premiums. Since the high-income earners
are risk averse, they tend to prefer low co-insurance rates. Furthermore, individuals prefer to
pay the lowest price possible for a given amount of insurance coverage. For an individual of
type pi, the premium differential between public and private insurance is determined by the
difference between incomes, which determines the amount of income redistribution, and the
difference between pi and the average risk in public insurance, which determines the gains
from risk pooling.
The following lemma shows that the incentives to join public insurance are stronger for
individuals with bad health, the intuition being that these individuals experience higher gains
from risk pooling in public insurance.
Lemma 1. For any given public plan under symmetric information, if pi joins public insurance,
then all types pj > pi join public insurance.
After performing the standard change of variables (see the Online Appendix) in Figure
1.1, the insurance contracts of two types pi < pj are depicted in the space of final wealths. In
the proof of Lemma 1, I show that the indifference curve of pi through his designated private
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Figure 1.1: Insurance market under symmetric information
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Notes: A = (pid, 0) and B = (pjd, 0), respectively, are the private insurance contracts
offered to two risks pi and pj , where pi < pj . For a given contribution rate τ , the pub-
lic insurance contract lies on the line EP . The exact position on EP depends on the
co-insurance rate of the public plan. Full insurance (η = 0) corresponds to P and no
insurance (η = 1) to E. zi and zj are used in the proof of Lemma 1.
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insurance contract, A, lies strictly above the one of type pj through his designated private
contract, B. Assuming that the public insurance budget is balanced on the line running
through the points E and P , we can see that both types join public insurance if the public
plan is located on or above D, only pj joins public insurance if the public plan is located on
or above C and below D, and none of the two types joins public insurance if the public plan
is located below C. This leads us to the health insurance market equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Fix a co-insurance rate ⌘ for the public plan and suppose that some high-income
earners choose to remain in public insurance. The health insurance market equilibrium under
symmetric information, if it exists, is unique and characterised by a threshold type pj, p1 < pj 
pn. The equilibrium strategy profile is such that s⇤(pi) = 0 for all pi < pj and s⇤(pk) = 1 for all
pk   pj, and the equilibrium set of contracts is the following:
C⇤ =
(
Ipub =
 
(1  ⌘) d  LpL +
Pn
k=j  kpk
 LyL +
Pn
k=j  kyH
y, ⌘
!
, Ipriv = (pid, 0)i2{i:s⇤(pi)=0}
)
.
The public plan is adversely selected in this equilibrium since only the bad risks remain
in public insurance.3 Formally, Ep[pd | s⇤ (p) = 1] = Ep[pd | p   pj] > Ep[pd], where the
inequality follows from the fact that pj > p1. The healthiest high-income earners do not join
public insurance in equilibrium because they have nothing to gain from risk pooling.
1.2.2 Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information
Now consider the case in which the insureds are privately informed about their personal
risk, while the insurers only know the distribution of risks in the population. Let us again
focus first on the private sector and abstract away from the public plan for a moment. From
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we know that, in equilibrium, less risky types will be offered
contracts with higher co-insurance rates, competition drives profits on each contract down to
zero, and contracts have to be separating; otherwise, there would exist a profitable deviation
that lies in cream-skinning the good risks out of a pooling contract. We also know that the
Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts are not generally second-best efficient,4 and that an equilibrium
3The existence disclaimer in Proposition 1 is necessary because there are parameter constellations for which
the government cannot set a budget-balancing contribution rate for a given amount of coverage in public in-
surance. This is due to the discreteness of the type distribution, which implies that the entry of any type into
public insurance has a discrete effect on the public budget. It could be circumvented by allowing for mixed
strategies or a continuum of types, but the model’s conclusions would not be altered and the exposition be more
cumbersome. To close the model, I assume that if the parameter constellation is such that there does not exist
an equilibrium according to Definition 1, the government does not maintain a balanced budget and finances the
budget gap out of general tax revenues.
4This is due to the requirement that each contract breaks even. Allowing for cross subsidisation, as in Wil-
son (1977), Miyazaki (1977), and Spence (1978), restores second-best efficiency, but cross subsidisation is a
somewhat counterintuitive outcome in a competitive market (see, e.g., Mimra and Wambach 2014).
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in pure strategies may fail to exist.5
The equilibrium properties of the private contract schedule remain basically unchanged in
the presence of a public plan. The only difference is that, with a coexisting public plan, some
incentive-compatibility constraints are not determined by making a type indifferent between
two private contracts, but between a private contract and the public plan.
When deciding between public and private insurance, high-income earners face the same
trade-off as under symmetric information. They weigh the difference in coverage between
public and private insurance against the public-private premium differential. Only that now,
under asymmetric information, coverage in private insurance is no longer necessarily higher
than coverage in public insurance. This feature gives rise to the possibility of advantageous
selection into public insurance, as can be seen in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Fix a co-insurance rate ⌘ for the public plan and suppose that some high-income
earners choose to remain in public insurance. The health insurance market equilibrium under
asymmetric information, if it exists, can feature two scenarios:
1. Adverse selection: there exists a threshold type pj, p1 < pj  pn, such that s⇤(pi) = 0 for
all pi < pj and s⇤(pk) = 1 for all pk   pj, and the equilibrium set of contracts is
C⇤ =
(
Ipub =
 
(1  ⌘) d  LpL +
Pn
k=j  kpk
 LyL +
Pn
k=j  kyH
y, ⌘
!
, Ipriv = (pi (1   i) d,  i)i2{i:s⇤(pi)=0}
)
,
where Iprivi = (pi(1   i)d,  i) is the private contract which will be chosen by type pi.
2. Nonmonotone selection: there exist two threshold types, pj and pk, p1 < pj  pk < pn, such
that s⇤(pi) = 0 for all pi < pj, s⇤(pr) = 1 for all pj  pr  pk, and s⇤(pl) = 0 for all pl > pk,
and the equilibrium set of contracts is
C⇤ =
(
Ipub =
 
(1  ⌘) d  LpL +
Pk
r=j  rpr
 LyL +
Pk
r=j  ryH
y, ⌘
!
, Ipriv = (pi (1   i) d,  i)i2{i:s⇤(pi)=0}
)
,
where Iprivi = (pi(1   i)d,  i) is the private contract which will be chosen by type pi.
The equilibrium schedule of private contracts satisfies the following: (i) uniqueness: Ipriv is
unique, (ii) no distortion at the top: if s⇤(pn) = 0, then  n = 0, (iii) distortion at the bottom: if
s⇤(pi) = 0 and pi < pn, then  i > 0, (iv) incentive compatibility: if s⇤(pi) = s⇤(pi+1) = 0, then
U [(pi+1(1  i+1)d,  i+1), pi+1] = U [(pi(1  i)d,  i), pi+1], and if s⇤(pi) = 0 and s⇤(pi+1) = 1, then
U(Ipub, pi+1) = U [(pi(1    i)d,  i), pi+1], (v) monotonicity: if s⇤(pi) = s⇤(pj) = 0 and pj > pi,
then  j <  i, and (vi) positive insurance: if s⇤(pi) = 0, then  i < 1.
5With two types, the unique equilibrium ceases to exist when there are too many low risks. With more
than two types, the conditions for equilibrium existence are more demanding; Riley (1985) identifies sufficient
conditions for this case.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium under asymmetric information with nonmonotone selection
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Notes: A, B, and C are the incentive-compatible, actuarially fair private insurance con-
tracts offered to types p1, p2, and p3, respectively, where p1 < p2 < p3. Ipub is the public
plan. Types p1 and p3 prefer private over public insurance. Type p2 prefers public over
private insurance. The incentive-compatible contract for type p1, A, is designed such that
type p2 is indifferent between this contract and public insurance. In the absence of a
public plan, private insurers would offer the contract D to type p1.
The ﬁrst scenario, adverse selection, is the unique market outcome when all participants
are symmetrically informed. The second scenario, which I call nonmonotone selection, occurs
exclusively under asymmetric information. Under asymmetric information, private insurers
offer screening contracts, which include less coverage for the good risks. This can lead to a
situation in which relatively healthy individuals, who are offered a contract with little cov-
erage in private insurance, stay in public insurance, because they dislike the risk that comes
with the private contract, whereas some relatively sick individuals, who are offered a private
contract with generous coverage, choose private insurance. But, as under symmetric informa-
tion, the healthiest high-income earners do not join public insurance, because private insurers
are always able to design a contract that is only appealing to individuals of type p1.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the second scenario for the case of three types, p1 < p2 < p3. In
equilibrium, type p2 chooses public insurance, and types p1 and p3 purchase private insurance.
The equilibrium set of contracts is given by C∗ = {Ipub, A, C}. Depending on the distribution
of types, selection into public insurance can be adverse or advantageous. Formally, Ep[pd |
s∗ (p) = 1] = p2d and Ep[pd] = (λ1p1 + λ2p2 + λ3p3)d/(λ1 + λ2 + λ3), so that the public plan
is adversely selected if λ1(p2 − p1) > λ3(p3 − p2) and advantageously selected if the reverse
inequality holds.
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One special feature of a parallel public and private health insurance market is that some
types can obtain more comprehensive coverage than in a purely private health insurance
market: In the example of Figure 1.2, the incentive-compatible contract that can be offered
to type p1 is A. In the absence of a public plan, private insurers must reduce the coverage for
type p1 to the level of contract D, in order to guarantee incentive compatibility.
Against the common expectation that private health insurers will cream skim the best risks
and leave the bad risks in public insurance, the model shows that selection between public
and private insurance depends on the informational scenario. Corollary 1 summarises the
model’s predictions, which provide the basis for the test of asymmetric information that will
be performed later on.
Corollary 1. Under symmetric information, health status and health insurance choice are monotonously
related, and the public plan is adversely selected. Under asymmetric information, the relationship
between health status and health insurance choice can be monotone or U-shaped, and the public
plan can be adversely or advantageously selected.
The welfare consequences of asymmetric information under public health insurance with
opt-out are ambiguous and depend on the type of selection into public insurance. If asym-
metric information reduces adverse selection into public insurance, or even leads to advan-
tageous selection into public insurance, then all low-income earners are better off and some
high-income earners (those who receive less coverage in private insurance) are worse off than
under symmetric information. This result stands in contrast to the welfare consequences of
asymmetric information in a purely private market for health insurance, in which asymmetric
information unambiguously reduces welfare.
1.3 Public Health Insurance with Opt-out in Germany
About 85% of the German population holds public health insurance, which is provided by non-
profit insurers, so-called sickness funds. Public health insurance is largely financed through the
contribution of its members, though a small part of the cost (less than 5%) is financed through
general taxation. While public insurance is mandatory for the majority of the population,
certain groups are allowed to opt out and buy substitutive private health insurance. Opting
out of public insurance becomes possible when gross labor income is above the so-called
compulsory insurance threshold (53,550 Euros in 2014), or when an individual is exempt
based on his occupation. The two most important occupation groups that are exempt from
the public insurance mandate are civil servants and the self-employed. About 15% of the
population has decided to opt out and holds substitutive private health insurance, which is
provided by for-profit insurance companies. Once an individual opts out of public insurance,
reentry into the public system is restricted and becomes possible only when the criteria that
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determine eligibility to opt out are no longer satisfied.6
The most important difference between public and private health insurance lies in the
premium calculation. Premiums in public insurance depend only on labor income. Publicly
insured employees pay a fraction of their gross wage (8.2% in 2014) up to the contribution
ceiling (48,600 Euros in 2014), above which contributions are zero. The employee contribu-
tion is matched with a contribution of similar size from the employer (7.3% in 2014), which
is also paid if the employee decides to become privately insured. The contribution rate for
the self-employed is equal to the sum of the employee and employer contribution, so that the
self-employed have stronger incentives, c.p., to choose private insurance. Premiums in private
insurance are risk rated and not tied to income. They are fixed at the initial enrollment and
cannot be adjusted in response to health shocks after a contract has been signed. Moreover,
private contracts are lifetime contracts and cannot be cancelled by the insurer unless premi-
ums are not paid. Therefore, private insurance clients are, for the most part, protected against
reclassification risk.
Risk rating in private insurance is conducted on the basis of mandatory health question-
naires.7 Most insurers elicit the same information from potential consumers. Applicants have
to report height and weight, disability status, chronic diseases, pregnancy status, a potential
HIV infection, ambulatory treatments within the last three years, stationary treatments within
the last five years, prescribed pharmaceuticals within the last 3 years, absences from work
during the last three years, and psychological therapies within the last 10 years. Based on
this information, insurers can apply risk surcharges or deny coverage for certain diseases or
chronic conditions.
Contract customisation is another important aspect in which public and private insurance
differ. Private insurance customers can select a contract that is individually optimal. Pri-
vate insurers typically offer several benefit packages and annual deductibles; some private
contracts also include co-insurance rates. Public insurance, on the other hand, offers little
room for consumer choice. Almost all of the benefits that are covered by public health insur-
ance are dictated by the regulator, and consumers do not have much choice in changing the
cost-sharing rules of their contract. The standard public health insurance contract imposes
little out-of-pocket expenses on its customers, which arise from moderate co-payments for
pharmaceuticals and hospital stays.
When individuals choose between public and private health insurance, the relative price
of the two plays a key role. This relative price depends on several factors. Most importantly,
the relative price of public insurance increases with health status, since private premiums de-
crease with health and public premiums do not depend on health. The relative price of public
6Individuals above the age of 54 cannot switch from private to public insurance under any circumstances.
7As false reporting in the questionnaires can lead to withholding of benefits or termination of the contract,
private insurance applicants have strong incentives to answer truthfully.
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insurance decreases in age for two reasons. First, health deteriorates so that risk surcharges
may apply. Second, private insurers are legally mandated to build up old-age provisions in
order to keep premiums constant over the life-cycle. As the time period over which these old-
age provisions can be built up becomes shorter the older the applicant, premiums increase.
Public insurance is relatively cheap for families since non-working spouses and dependent
children below 26 years of age are insured free of charge in public insurance. Women face
a lower relative price of public insurance than men because private insurers charge women
higher premiums throughout the sample period.8 Civil servants pay a high relative price for
public insurance because they and their dependent family members receive partial reimburse-
ments of medical expenses through the so-called Beihilfe, which reduces the cost of private
insurance by up to 80% but does not affect the price of public insurance. Self-employed in-
dividuals pay a high relative price for public insurance since they bear both the employer
and employee contribution towards public insurance. The relative price of public insurance
increases with the income of self-employed individuals and civil servants until the contribu-
tion ceiling is reached. Individuals who qualify to opt out of public insurance based on their
income pay a fixed premium for public insurance since the compulsory insurance threshold lies
above the contribution ceiling.
1.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on data from the SOEP, a long-running panel which elicits
information from a representative sample of households living in Germany. At the individual
level, the SOEP contains subjective and objective health measures, health insurance details,
as well as a wide array of socio-economic variables.
The sample period covers the years from 1998 to 2011; though information from 2011
is only used to calculate insurance status in 2010.9 The sample consists of individuals aged
20 to 65 who are eligible to purchase private insurance, are not insured through one of their
family members, and switch insurance status at most once. Individuals under 20 of age are
excluded to avoid distortions which may arise from family insurance. Individuals above the
age of 65 are excluded because they are unlikely to consider switching to private insurance
due to prohibitively high premiums caused by risk adjustment and missing old-age provisions.
Individuals who are insured through one of their family members are excluded because they
do not make an active decision. Individuals who switch their insurance status more than once
are excluded because these switches likely represent misreporting of insurance status, given
that switching from private to public insurance is heavily regulated. Individuals in the sample
8However, as of December 2012, gender-based discrimination of insurance premiums is prohibited in the
European Union by a ruling of the European Court of Justice.
9Observations from prior to 1998 had to be excluded because important controls are missing.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of selected variables
Health measures Socio-economic factors
Public Private Public Private
Self-assessed health 3.586 3.647 Female 0.247 0.300
(0.837) (0.824) (0.431) (0.458)
Disability 0.054 0.043 Age 44.891 46.170
(0.226) (0.202) (9.630) (9.628)
Sick leave >6 weeks 0.094 0.056 Married 0.738 0.692
(0.292) (0.229) (0.440) (0.462)
Hospitalised 0.080 0.078 Children in household 0.782 0.633
(0.271) (0.268) (1.028) (0.916)
Nights in hospital 0.817 0.724 Self-employed 0.272 0.304
(5.120) (4.692) (0.445) (0.460)
Doctor visits per quarter 1.867 2.041 Civil servant 0.025 0.446
(3.190) (3.730) (0.155) (0.497)
N 21,172 16,606 N 21,172 16,606
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are calculated based on all observations from
1998 to 2010 of individuals aged 20 to 65 who are eligible to purchase private insurance, are not
insured through one of their family members, and do not switch insurance status more than once.
Two-sided t-tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference in means between public and private
insurance at the 1% level of significance for all variables except hospitalised (p=0.542) and nights in
hospital (p=0.068). Number of observations varies by variable and sample.
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are self-employed, civil servants, or have incomes above the compulsory insurance threshold.
In total, there are 38,633 person-year observations from 8,310 individuals. Out of those, 494
individuals (5.9%) opt out of public insurance.
Table 1.1 contains means and standard deviations of selected variables stratified by in-
surance status. From these statistics, we can infer that the privately insured appear to be
healthier: they have better self-reported health, and they are less likely to be disabled and
to take a sick leave of more than six weeks within a year. On the other hand, the privately
insured seem to consume slightly more medical care: they go more often to the doctor, they
are about equally likely to be hospitalised within a year, and they spend roughly the same
amount of nights in the hospital. With regard to the socio-economic characteristics, private
insurance clients are older and more likely to be female, which stands in contrast to the insti-
tutional incentives. In accordance with the institutional incentives, the privately insured have
fewer children, are less likely to be married, and are more likely to be self-employed or civil
servants.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
The first goal of the empirical analysis is to identify the nature of selection between public
and private health insurance, which will be inferred from the correlation of the error terms in
a bivariate probit model of health insurance choice (public or private) and subsequent health-
care use that includes no controls. In a second step, I decompose selection into a part that
is due to observable characteristics of insureds which affect the relative price between public
and private insurance and a part that is due other factors. To this end, I include observable
characteristics of insureds that determine the relative price between public and private in-
surance as independent variables in the bivariate probit model of healthcare utilisation and
health insurance choice. The results of this decomposition should be of particular interest
to policymakers who want to reduce selection, since the two selection components require
different approaches.
However, as is well known, the correlation of the error terms in a bivariate probit model
of health insurance choice and healthcare use, with or without controlling for observables,
can reflect both moral hazard and adverse selection. To address this issue, I choose a measure
of healthcare use that is arguably less susceptible to moral hazard: hospitalisations. Patients
generally do not choose to become hospitalised considering the financial consequences of the
hospitalisation; frequently the patient’s medical condition is so severe that a hospitalisation
is inevitable, or the physician, and not the patient, decides about the hospitalisation.10 The
10Early empirical support for the hypothesis that hospitalisations are not affected by moral hazard stems from
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al. 1987). The recent Oregon Health Insurance Experiment
finds evidence of moral hazard in hospitalisations (Finkelstein et al. 2012), but in subjects who predominantly
earn low incomes. For a variety of reasons, these individuals may react differently to health insurance coverage
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validity of the empirical approach hinges on the identifying assumption that hospitalisations
do not depend on health insurance status (public or private) other than through selection.
There are several reasons why the identifying assumption is particularly reasonable in the
context of the German health insurance system. First, the cost of a hospitalisation is roughly
the same for privately and publicly insured patients.11 This implies that, even if people have a
price elasticity of demand for hospitalisations which is different from zero, the moral hazard
effect of health insurance should be modest. Second, several studies have examined the
incentive effect of private health insurance coverage on hospitalisations in Germany, all of
which conclude that there is no statistically significant effect.12 Finally, there are no supply-
side incentives at work, since payment rates for hospital care are the same for publicly and
privately insured patients.
Following Bünnings and Tauchmann (2015), I model health insurance choice as a hazard
model in discrete time with private insurance as the absorbing state, i.e., individuals enter
the estimations only up to the point at which they choose to become privately insured. The
dependent variable OPTOUTit equals zero as long as an individual chooses to remain in pub-
lic insurance. OPTOUTit equals one in the period before an individual first reports to be
privately insured, which is done in order to guarantee that the independent variables are pre-
determined. In all other cases, OPTOUTit is set to missing. German legislation dictates the
choice of a hazard model, as it generally restricts private insurance clients to stay in private
insurance.
I estimate variants of the following bivariate probit model:
OPTOUTit = 1 (a1 + b1Xit + c1Zit + e1it > 0) . (1.2)
HOSPITALit+1 = 1 (a2 + b2Xit + c2Zit + e2it > 0) . (1.3)
HOSPITALit+1 is an indicator that equals one if individual i is hospitalised in period t+ 1, the
baseline measure of healthcare use. Xit is a vector of observable attributes of individual i that
determine the relative price between private and public insurance at time t.13 Zit is a vector
than the individuals who qualify to opt out in Germany.
11The publicly insured pay a copayment of 10 Euros per day of hospital stay, up to a maximum of 280 Euros
a year. The most common form of cost sharing in private insurance is a deductible, where the most popular
deductibles are, in that order, 0 Euros, 300 Euros, and 600 Euros.
12The two most convincing studies are by Hullegie and Klein (2010) and Polyakova (2014), who exploit
the compulsory insurance threshold in a regression discontinuity design, with which the authors can control for
selection into public and private health insurance. Using SOEP data, both studies find no incentive effect of
health insurance status on hospital stays. Two earlier studies also do not find an effect of the type of health
insurance on hospitalisations (Geil et al. 1997, Riphahn et al. 2003).
13X contains disability status, the probability of a hospitalisation, the number of hospitalisations, and the
number of days spent in the hospital for the last five years, the number of doctor visits for the last three years,
absences from work for more than six weeks for the last three years, number of children in household, marital
status, gender, an indicator of being a women of child-bearing age, five-year age band dummies, an indicator
of self-employment, an interaction term between self-employment and the logarithm of income, an indicator of
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of unused observables and will be described in more detail below.
The error terms eit = (e1it, e2it) are assumed to be independently, identically, and normally
distributed across individuals. They may, however, be correlated over time for a given indi-
vidual. In the main analysis, I will estimate a pooled bivariate probit model with standard
errors clustered at the individual level. Because some individuals may decide to stay in public
insurance once and for all when they become eligible to opt out of public insurance, without
reevaluating the relative price between public and private insurance in future periods, I will,
as a robustness check, estimate the bivariate probit model on the subsample of individuals
who are in their first or second year of being eligible to opt out.
In a first step, I will estimate the bivariate probit model with b = (b1, b2) = 0 and
c = (c1, c2) = 0 imposed. The correlation between the error terms in this specification re-
veals the total extent of selection between public and private insurance. Subsequently, I will
estimate the bivariate probit model with c = 0 imposed, which is akin to the standard positive
correlation test (Chiappori and Salanié 2000). The correlation between the error terms in
this specification reflects the part of selection that is not related to the relative price between
public and private insurance. We can then back out the effect of the relative price between
public and private insurance from the difference in the correlation coefficient between the
model without controls and the model which controls for observables. Following this decom-
position, I turn to identifying the sources of selection by including unused observables in the
bivariate probit model (Finkelstein and Poterba 2014). Finally, I use a source of private in-
formation about health status to test for asymmetric information exploiting the predictions of
the theoretical model.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Magnitude and Sources of Selection
Table 1.2 reports the correlation of the residuals from the bivariate probit model, with and
without controlling for observables that determine the relative price between public and pri-
vate insurance. The results for the full sample, which are shown in column 1, indicate that
public insurance is adversely selected on balance: individuals who opt out of public insurance
in period t are significantly less likely to be hospitalised in period t + 1, as evidenced by the
negative correlation coefficient of the bivariate probit model without controls. Once we con-
trol for observable differences across individuals that affect the relative price between private
and public insurance, there remains less unexplained correlation between the choice to opt
out and future hospitalisations. However, since the residual correlation is still negative and
statistically significant, we can conclude that it is not only the relative price between public
being a civil servant, an interaction term between civil servant and the logarithm of income, and a set of year
dummies.
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Table 1.2: Magnitude of selection
Full sample High income Civil servants Self-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: No controls
⇢ˆ -0.151*** -0.169*** 0.103 -0.190**
Wald test of ⇢ = 0 (p-value) (0.001) (0.002) (0.547) (0.046)
Panel B: Control for observables
⇢ˆ -0.098* -0.101 0.150 -0.119
Wald test of ⇢ = 0 (p-value) (0.055) (0.108) (0.546) (0.274)
N 12,767 8,438 338 3,991
Notes: Table reports correlations of the residuals from bivariate probit estimations of equations
(1.2) and (1.3) and p-values (in parentheses) of Wald tests of ⇢ = 0. Panel A reports correlations
from the model with b = c = 0. Panel B reports correlations from the model with c = 0. Column
1 reports correlations for the whole sample. Column 2 reports correlations for the subsample of
individuals who qualify to opt out of public insurance solely based on income. Columns 3 and 4,
respectively, report correlations for the subsample of civil servants and self-employed, respectively.
p-values are based on standard errors which are clustered at the individual level. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
and private insurance that gives rise to adverse selection into public insurance but also other
factors. Comparing the size of the two correlation coefficients, we see that the relative price
between public and private insurance actually accounts for only about one-third ( 0.151 +
0.098 =  0.053) of the total extent of adverse selection into public insurance, the other
two-thirds ( 0.098) being accounted for by other factors.
Since the institutional setup is such that civil servants and the self-employed have stronger
incentives to join private insurance than those who qualify to opt out of public insurance solely
based on income, I stratify the preceding results by eligibility criterium. The corresponding
estimates, which are shown in columns 2-4 of Table 1.2, show that the results for the self-
employed and income-rich are similar and coincide with the results for the whole sample,
while the results for the subsample of civil servants are diametrically opposed. We observe
a positive and statistically insignificant unconditional correlation between the choice to opt
out of public insurance and future hospitalisations for civil servants. Since almost all civil
servants join private insurance, it is perhaps no surprise that private insurers cannot select
civil servants who are better risks. The effect of the relative price between public and private
insurance on civil servants is negative but small ( 0.047). This could be a result of the fact
that civil servants pay only a fraction of their private insurance premium, which makes them
less price sensitive.
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Having established the existence of adverse selection into public insurance, the next logi-
cal question is: what drives this selection? To answer this question, I follow Finkelstein and
Poterba (2014) and search for unused observables that are correlated with both health insur-
ance choice and healthcare use after controlling for observables, where unused observables
are variables that do not affect the relative price between public and private health insurance
but which are observed by the econometrician. Table 1.3 reports results for three unused ob-
servables that matter for selection between public and private health insurance: self-assessed
health, risk aversion, and residential location. Several other unused observables, including
smoking status, education, frequency of sport/exercise, hours of work, and income, do not ex-
plain selection, since they are not correlated with both health insurance choice and healthcare
use after controlling for observables.
Self-assessed health is reported on a five-point scale from one (=very bad) to five (=very
good) and explains a part of the adverse selection against the public sector: after controlling
for observables, individuals with higher self-assessed health are less likely to be hospitalised
and more likely to choose private insurance. This self-selection of consumers is consistent
with the idea that private insurers screen their applicants. Healthy individuals choose private
contracts with high deductibles, in return for low insurance premiums, whereas sick individ-
uals prefer public insurance, which involves moderate cost sharing. One caveat applies to
this result, however. The observables which are included in X can potentially not control
for all the differences between individuals that affect the relative price between public and
private health insurance. It could be, therefore, that self-assessed health picks up a part of
the effect of the observables, meaning that the coefficients above are an upper bound on the
impact of the unobservable (for insurers) part of health status on health insurance choice and
hospitalisations. I will return to this issue in Section 1.6.3.
The second source of selection is risk aversion, which is reported on a scale from zero to
ten, where individuals are asked to assess their aversion towards risk in general.14 I follow
Bünnings and Tauchmann (2015) and others and consider risk preferences as fixed over time,
using the average value of an individual’s responses. Table 1.3 shows that risk aversion gives
rise to advantageous selection in favour of the public sector: after controlling for observables,
risk-averse individuals are less willing to opt out of public insurance and less likely to be
hospitalised. Switching to private insurance implies uncertainty about future premiums, as
changes in family status translate into premium changes in private insurance. For example,
a privately insured couple who become parents has to pay for their child in private health
insurance, whereas the child is insured free of charge in public insurance. This may explain
why risk-averse individuals prefer public insurance. The finding that risk-averse individuals
tend to be less risky has been observed also in other contexts (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006).
Possible explanations for this result are that the risk averse use more preventive care, or that
14Dohmen et al. (2011) confirm that this question is a good measure of risk aversion in several domains.
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Table 1.3: Sources of selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: OPTOUT
Self-assessed health 0.005** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Risk aversion -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
West Germany -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.004) (0.004)
Dependent variable: HOSPITAL
Self-assessed health -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.003) (0.003)
Risk aversion -0.003** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
West Germany -0.011* -0.011*
(0.006) (0.006)
N 12,757 12,010 12,767 12,001
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of three unused observables from bivari-
ate probit estimations of equations (1.2) and (1.3). Coefficient estimates for the ob-
servables (X) are suppressed. Means of OPTOUT and HOSPITAL vary across columns.
Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
they abstain from undertaking risky activities.
The final source of selection is residential location. Individuals who reside in the states
of former West Germany advantageously select public insurance. Consequently, individuals
living in the states of former East Germany adversely select public public insurance. Since
the former are more numerous (361 residents of West Germany opt out vs. 133 residents
of East Germany), residential location leads to advantageous selection into public insurance
on average. Whether this selection is driven by consumers or insurers cannot be answered
in the present framework and with the available data. Bauhoff (2012) shows that supply-
side selection on geographic location exists, suggesting that the latter is driving the results to
some extent. Heterogeneous consumer preferences may also play a role, but Bünnings and
Tauchmann (2015) show that, except for risk aversion, personality traits do not appear to
affect insurance choice.
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Table 1.4: Testing for asymmetric information
Dependent variable: OPTOUT HOSPITAL
SAH=1 0.010 (0.018) 0.057* (0.034)
SAH=2 (omitted) 0.000 — 0.000 —
SAH=3 0.014** (0.006) -0.044*** (0.011)
SAH=4 0.014** (0.005) -0.074*** (0.011)
SAH=5 0.022*** (0.007) -0.083*** (0.012)
N 12,757 12,757
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of the five categories
of self-assessed health from bivariate probit estimations of equations
(1.2) and (1.3). Coefficient estimates for the observables (X) are
suppressed. 1=very bad, 2=bad, 3=satisfactory, 4=good, 5=very
good. Means of OPTOUT and HOSPITAL are 0.035 and 0.077, re-
spectively. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual
level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
1.6.2 Testing for Asymmetric Information
The standard test of asymmetric information analyses the consumer’s decision between two
different insurance contracts, where one contract offers more generous coverage than the
other, and the occurrence of subsequent risk events (Chiappori and Salanié 2000). In the
present setting, however, individuals choose between public and private health insurance,
which are not ordered by the level of coverage. We can therefore not proceed as usual.
Fortunately, the theoretical model of Section 1.2 offers a one-sided test of asymmetric
information. Recalling Corollary 1, we know that both advantageous selection into public
insurance and a U-shaped relationship between the choice of private insurance and unobserv-
able (to the insurers) health status occur only under asymmetric information. Hence, either
of the two indicates the presence of asymmetric information. Notice that since the model
describes the situation within a risk cell, we have to control for observables that determine
the relative price between public and private insurance to test for asymmetric information.
As we have seen in Table 1.2, the residuals are negatively correlated after controlling for
observables, meaning that one of the two indicators of asymmetric information is not present.
Nevertheless, we may still conclude that there is asymmetric information, in case we find a
U-shaped relationship between health insurance choice and unobservable health status. Self-
assessed health is a natural candidate to test for such a relationship, as it is likely to contain
private information about health status. In order to pick up a potential nonmonotone effect
of self-assessed health, I replace the previously considered linear term with indicators for the
five categories of self-assessed health.
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Table 1.4 shows the estimated average marginal effects of these five categories after con-
trolling for observables. The probability that a hospitalisation occurs decreases strictly in
self-assessed health, meaning that the residual information contained in self-assessed health
is indeed predictive of health status. On the other hand, the probability of opting out of public
insurance is nonmonotonously related to self-assessed health: the relationship is U-shaped,
where the probability of opting out of public insurance is lowest for individuals with a self-
assessed health status of two. According to the theoretical model, this U-shaped relationship
indicates the presence of asymmetric information between private insurers and their clients.
However, due to there being only a handful of observations in the lowest category of self-
assessed health, the coefficient estimates for this category are very imprecise. In particular,
the estimate from the opt-out equation is not statistically different from zero, so that the
evidence in favour of information asymmetry should be considered as merely suggestive.
1.6.3 Robustness Checks
This section discusses potential threats to the validity of the empirical approach and examines
the robustness of the conclusions to these threats. The detailed results of this sensitivity anal-
ysis are collected in Tables 1.6-1.8 in Appendix 1.B. The qualitative conclusions do not change
in any of the alternative specifications. In fact, the results are often quantitatively similar to
those of the baseline estimates. Notably also, the nonmonotone pattern between self-assessed
health and health insurance choice is preserved in all of the alternative specifications. Never-
theless, due to large variations in the number of observations and corresponding variations in
statistical power, the estimates’ statistical significance occasionally departs from those of the
baseline estimates.
The most pressing issue is the potential mismatch between the actual observables that
determine the relative price between public and private and the observables which are taken
into account in the empirical analysis. Some variables in the SOEP are less informative than
the corresponding questions from the insurer questionnaires. Moreover, some items from
the insurer questionnaires are not included in the SOEP, or they are included only in some
years. Private insurers could thus have more information about insurance applicants than
what is controlled for with the vector of observables. To assess the extent of this issue, I have
regressed private health insurance premiums on the vector of observables. Encouragingly,
the estimates from this regression, which are available upon request, show that X explains a
large fraction of the variation in private health insurance premiums, even without taking into
account differences in benefits packages and cost sharing. I therefore argue that the vector X
provides a reasonable approximation to the actual variables that determine the relative price
between public and private insurance. I moreover perform a couple of robustness checks in
which X includes further health-related variables, such as the existence of chronic conditions
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and the physical and mental component scales described in Andersen et al. (2007).15
Another issue is that some individuals may only actively consider opting out of public
insurance in the first few periods when they become eligible to opt out. In order to show
that the estimates are not driven by repeated observations on individuals who do not make
an active decision between public and private insurance, I perform a robustness check on the
subsample of individuals who are in the first or second year of being eligible to choose private
insurance.
Next, I assess the measure of healthcare use of the baseline model, which is an indicator
that equals one if an individual is hospitalised in the year after the making choice between
public and private insurance. I consider two alternatives measures of healthcare use. First, I
construct an indicator that equals one if an individual is hospitalised in period t+1 or t+2. This
indicator addresses the issue that hospitalisations are rare, meaning that there are relatively
few observations where the dependent variable HOSPITAL equals one. Second, I construct an
indicator that equals one if an individual stays three or more nights in the hospital in period
t+ 1. This indicator addresses the issue that hospitalisations differ in terms of the severity of
illness of the patient, which is not accounted for in the baseline regressions.16
Finally, there appears to be some measurement error in income in the SOEP data (see,
e.g., Hullegie and Klein 2010). To address this issue, I perform a robustness check in which
I exclude all individuals with income equal to zero (who can only be civil servants or self-
employed) and keep only the self-employed, civil servants, and individuals with incomes of
5,000 above the compulsory insurance threshold, in order to guarantee that all individuals in
the sample can actually choose to opt out of public insurance.
1.7 Conclusion and Discussion
There are a number of benefits associated to the German public health insurance with opt-out
scheme. These include the socialisation of risks in public insurance vis-à-vis a system relying
only on private health insurance, public insurance being an insurance of last resort to the
seriously sick and the poor, a reduced number of insureds having double coverage compared
to a system with a national health service such as the UK, and an increased competition
for clients, which creates strong incentives for public health insurance providers to increase
efficiency and quality.
These benefits have to be weighed against the potential for adverse selection into public
insurance. Since private health insurance premiums are based on individual risks and public
health insurance contributions are not, private insurers are expected to attract observably
15Both variables are available only for a few years and therefore not included in the baseline regressions.
16In the baseline regressions, minor conditions, which may require just one or two nights in the hospital, are
lumped together with the most severe health conditions, which may require weeks, or even months, of hospital
care.
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better risks. Moreover, private insurers may also attract unobservably better risks, through
offering contracts with lower premiums and higher degrees of cost sharing than the public
plan; though, as this paper shows, private insurers do not necessarily succeed in doing so
when there is asymmetric information. Adverse selection can also become worse over time:
if the healthy high-income earners switch to private insurance and the government raises
premiums to compensate for the fact that the average risk in public insurance has gone up,
more relatively healthy high-income earners may feel inclined to opt out. This process can
develop in a similar fashion as the adverse selection death spiral described in Cutler and
Zeckhauser (1998); though public insurance would not become extinct since the low-income
earners cannot opt out.
Whether and to what extent public insurance is adversely selected is ultimately an empiri-
cal question. The evidence presented in this and other papers suggests that adverse selection
is a serious issue in the German health insurance system. Those most affected by it are the
low-income earners: they are mandatorily insured in public insurance and have to compen-
sate the outflow of good risks from public to private insurance with higher contributions. For
their benefit, it will thus be important that policymakers address the issue of adverse selec-
tion, so as to guarantee that public insurance can attract a diversified pool of risks in the
future. In 2007, Germany introduced a reform that may mitigate adverse selection into public
insurance. Since then, public health insurance providers are allowed to offer contracts with
varying degrees of cost sharing, so-called choice policies. How this reform has affected risk
selection in the German health insurance system remains an open question and could prove
to be an interesting topic for future research.
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Appendices
1.A Theory Appendix
1.A.1 Contracts in the Final Wealths Space
Insurance can be expressed in terms of the final wealths it implies. An individual with risk pi
and income y who has purchased the insurance contract I = (↵,  ) has final wealth WNA =
y   ↵ if no accident occurs and final wealth WA = y    d  ↵ in case of an accident. Solving
for the premium and the co-insurance rate, we get that ↵ = y WNA and   = (WNA WA)/d.
Hence, expected utility can be expressed as
U (WNA,WA, pi) = piu (WA) + (1  pi)u (WNA) ,
and expected profits can be expressed as
⇡ (WNA,WA, pi) = y  WNA   pi (WA  WNA + d) .
The marginal rate of substitution for a risk pi in the point (WNA,WA) is equal to
dWA
dWNA
    
U(WNA,WA,pi)
=  1  pi
pi
u0 (WNA)
u0 (WA)
. (1.4)
Lemma 2 follows immediately from inspection of (1.4).
Lemma 2. In any point (WNA,WA), dWA/dWNA|U(WNA,WA,pi) < dWA/dWNA|U(WNA,WA,pj) if and
only if pi < pj.
This means that the indifference curves of two different types can be ordered by steep-
ness: the less riskier type has steeper indifference curves. Besides, if insurance is provided
at actuarially fair or favourable odds, then more insurance is always better, as the following
Lemma shows.
Lemma 3. For 0 <   < 1, U [(q(1   )d,  ), pi] is strictly decreasing in   if q  pi.
Proof of Lemma 3. The partial derivative of U [(q(1   )d,  ), pi] with respect to   is
@U [(q (1   ) d,  ) , pi]
@ 
= qd (1  pi)u0 [yH   q (1   ) d] pid (1  q)u0 [yH    d  q (1   ) d] .
Since 0 <   < 1 and u00(·) < 0, u0[yH    d  q(1   )d] > u0[yH   q(1   )d]. It is easy to check
then that the partial derivative above is strictly negative for q  pi.
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Isoprofit curves in (WNA,WA)-space are straight lines with slope  (1   pi)/pi. The zero-
profit line for an individual with risk pi and income y is characterised by the following equa-
tion: WA = y/pi   d  (1  pi)/piWNA.
Public insurance leads to final wealths W pubNA = y(1  ⌧) and W pubA = y(1  ⌧)  ⌘d, respec-
tively, in the case of no accident and in the case of an accident. Solving for ⌧ and ⌘, we get
that ⌧ = 1 W pubNA/y and ⌘ = (W pubNA  W pubA )/d. The public budget is balanced if
W pubA =
 LyL +
Pn
i=1  is (pi) yH
 LpL +
Pn
i=1  is (pi) pi
  d W pubNA
✓
1
y
 LyL +
Pn
i=1  is (pi) yH
 LpL +
Pn
i=1  is (pi) pi
  1
◆
.
Hence, for a given strategy profile s = [s(pi)]i2{1,...,n}, feasible allocations under the public in-
surance plan are located on a straight line in (WNA,WA)-space. The slope of this line depends
on the characteristics of those individuals who join public insurance:
dW pubA
dW pubNA
=  
✓
1
y
 LyL +
Pn
i=1  is (pi) yH
 LpL +
Pn
i=1  is (pi) pi
  1
◆
.
The slope is flatter for high- than for low-income earners due to income redistribution.
1.A.2 Proofs
Lemma 1. For any given public plan under symmetric information, if pi joins public insurance,
then all types pj > pi join public insurance.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider any two types pi and pj, where p1  pi < pj  pn. To prove the
Lemma, it suffices to show that pi’s indifference curve lies strictly above pj ’s indifference curve,
within the insurance plane, when both types buy their designated private insurance contracts.
Three observations conclude the proof. First, note that pi’s indifference curve lies above pj ’s
indifference curve on the upper left edge of the insurance plane, since u(y pid) > u(y pjd).
Second, note that the indifference curves of two types cross at most once, since expected
utility satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees strict single crossing property. Third and finally, I show
that pi’s indifference curve lies above pj ’s indifference curve on the right edge of the insurance
plane, where WNA = y. Following the proof provided in Olivella and Vera-Hernández (2013)
and referring to Figure 1.1 on page 15, I want to show that zi > zj, where zi and zj satisfy the
following:
u (yH   pid) = piu (zi) + (1  pi)u (yH) .
u (yH   pjd) = pju (zj) + (1  pj)u (yH) .
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Since u0(·) > 0, zj < zi is equivalent to u(zj) < u(zi). Hence, I want to show that:
u (zj) =
u (yH   pjd)  (1  pj)u (yH)
pj
<
u (yH   pid)  (1  pi)u (yH)
pi
= u (zi) .
Rearranging terms, we obtain:
u (yH   pid) > pi
pj
u (yH   pjd) + pj   pi
pj
u (yH) . (1.5)
Denote q = pi/pj, x1 = yH   pjd, and x2 = yH . Note that q 2 (0, 1) and Eq(x) = q(yH   pjd) +
(1  q)yH = yH   pid. Hence, inequality (1.5) can be expressed as
u [Eq (x)] > Eq [u (x)] ,
which is true by Jensen’s inequality and the assumption that u(·) is strictly concave.
The following result is used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 4. No type chooses public insurance at actuarially unfavourable odds in the equilibrium
under symmetric information: if s⇤(pi) = 1, then pi   ⌧yH/(1  ⌘)d.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a type pi who chooses public
insurance at actuarially unfavourable odds in the equilibrium under symmetric information.
If private insurers duplicate the public contract and sell it exclusively to pi, abstracting for a
moment from the tie-breaking assumption, then they would generate strictly positive profits.
Then, there exists a contract I = (⌧yH   ", ⌘) that, if offered exclusively to type pi, would
attract all individuals of type pi and generate nonnegative profits. This violates the third
condition for equilibrium; contradiction.
Proposition 1. Fix a co-insurance rate ⌘ for the public plan and suppose that some high-income
earners choose to remain in public insurance. The health insurance market equilibrium, if it
exists, is unique and characterised by a threshold type pj, p1 < pj  pn. The equilibrium strategy
profile is such that s⇤(pi) = 0 for all pi < pj and s⇤(pk) = 1 for all pk   pj, and the equilibrium
set of contracts is the following
C⇤ =
(
Ipub =
 
(1  ⌘) d  LpL +
Pn
k=j  kpk
 LyL +
Pn
k=j  kyH
y, ⌘
!
, Ipriv = (pid, 0)i2{i:s⇤(pi)=0}
)
.
Proof of Proposition 1. Lemma 1 and the assumption that some high-income earners choose to
remain in public insurance imply that there exists a threshold pj, pj 2 {p1, . . . , pn}, such that
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s⇤(pi) = 0 for all i < j and s⇤(pk) = 1 for all k   j. For a given equilibrium strategy profile s⇤
and a given co-insurance rate ⌘ for the public plan, the contribution rate for public insurance,
⌧ , is determined by the balanced budget condition in equation (1.1). I proceed in a series of
steps. In Step 1, I show that only private contracts of the form Ipriv = (pid, 0)i2{1,...,n} can be in
the equilibrium set of contracts, C⇤. In Step 2, I show that type p1 never joins public insurance
in equilibrium. Finally, in Step 3, I show that the equilibrium is unique.
Step 1. Under symmetric information, the market for private health insurance is seg-
mented. Hence, we can fix a type pi. Suppose now, by contradiction, that there exists a
private contract I = (↵,  ) 2 C⇤, I 6= (pid, 0), which is chosen by pi in equilibrium. Either
I generates strictly positive profits or it does not offer full insurance, as if both were false
then I = (pid, 0). Suppose I generates strictly positive profits. Then, there exists a contract
I 0 = (↵ ",  ) that, if offered exclusively to type pi, would attract all individuals of type pi and
generate nonnegative profits. This violates the third condition for equilibrium; contradiction.
Suppose now that I does not offer full insurance. Then, by Lemma 3, there exists a contract
I 0 = (↵ + pi",     ") that, if offered exclusively to type pi, would attract all individuals of
type pi and generate nonnegative profits. This violates the third condition for equilibrium;
contradiction.
Step 2. By Lemma 4, it is sufficient to show that the public premium is always actuarially
unfavourable for type p1. The public premium is determined by the balanced budget condition
(1) and always actuarially unfavourable for p1 since
⌧yH
(1  ⌘) d =
 LpL +
Pn
i=1 s (pi) ipi
 L
yL
yH
+
Pn
i=1 s (pi) i
>
 LpL + (1   L) p1
 L
yL
yH
+ (1   L) > p1,
where the inequalities follow from yL < yH , p1  pL, and p1 < p2. Hence, s⇤(p1) = 0.
Step 3. Multiple equilibria can only arise when there are two or more equilibrium strategy
profiles for a given set of parameters. Suppose, by contradiction, that s⇤ and t⇤ are two
equilibrium strategy profiles and s⇤ 6= t⇤. By Lemma 1, we can order s⇤ and t⇤ by the lowest
occurrence of a one, if any. Denote s = max{i : s⇤(pi 1) = 0} and t = max{i : t⇤(pi 1) = 0}.
Suppose, w.l.o.g., that s < t. In equilibrium, the budget balancing contribution rate that
corresponds to s⇤ is given by
⌧s = (1  ⌘) d
 LpL +
Pn
i=s  ipi
 LyL +
Pn
i=s  iyH
= (1  ⌘) d  LpL +
Pt 1
i=s  ipi +
Pn
i=t  ipi
 LyL +
Pt 1
i=s  iyH +
Pn
i=t  iyH
.
By Lemma 4, we have that pi   ⌧syH/(1  ⌘)d for all i   s. Hence,
⌧s   (1  ⌘) d
 LpL +
Pt 1
i=s  i
⌧syH
(1 ⌘)d +
Pn
i=t  ipi
 LyL +
Pt 1
i=s  iyH +
Pn
i=t  iyH
.
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Rearranging yields
⌧s   (1  ⌘) d
 LpL +
Pn
i=t  ipi
 LyL +
Pn
i=t  iyH
= ⌧t.
Hence, U [(⌧syH , ⌘), ps]  U [(⌧tyH , ⌘), ps]. Further, U [(⌧syH , ⌘), ps]   U [(psd, 0), ps], since s⇤(ps) =
1, and U [(⌧tyH , ⌘), ps] < U [(psd, 0), ps], since t⇤(ps) = 0. A contradiction:
U [(psd, 0) , ps]  U [(⌧syH , ⌘) , ps]  U [(⌧tyH , ⌘) , ps] < U [(psd, 0) , ps] .
The following result is used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 5. No type chooses public insurance at actuarially unfavourable odds in the equilibrium
under asymmetric information: if s⇤(pi) = 1, then pi   ⌧yH/(1  ⌘)d.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a type pi who chooses public
insurance at actuarially unfavourable odds in the equilibrium under asymmetric information,
with the equilibrium set of contracts being C⇤. By Lemma 2, pi’s indifference curve through
Ipub is steeper than those of all types pj > pi. By Lemma 2 and the continuity of ⇡(·, pi),
there exists a contract I = (↵,  ), with ↵ < ⌧yH and   > ⌘, such that U(I, pi) > U(Ipub, pi),
U(I, pj) < U(Ipub, pj)  maxI02C⇤ U(I 0, pj) for all pj > pi, and ⇡(I, pi) > 0. Since, by construc-
tion, I will only be chosen by individuals with risk pi or lower, it will generate strictly positive
profits. Since I /2 C⇤, for if I 2 C⇤ then pi would not choose Ipub, the third condition for
equilibrium is violated; contradiction.
Proposition 2. Fix a co-insurance rate ⌘ for the public plan and suppose that some high-income
earners choose to remain in public insurance. The health insurance market equilibrium under
asymmetric information, if it exists, can feature two scenarios:
1. Adverse selection: there exists a threshold type pj, p1 < pj  pn, such that s⇤(pi) = 0 for all
pi < pj and s⇤(pk) = 1 for all pk   pj, and the equilibrium set of contracts is
C⇤ =
(
Ipub =
 
(1  ⌘) d  LpL +
Pn
k=j  kpk
 LyL +
Pn
k=j  kyH
y, ⌘
!
, Ipriv = (pi (1   i) d,  i)i2{i:s⇤(pi)=0}
)
,
where Iprivi = (pi(1   i)d,  i) is the private contract which will be chosen by type pi.
2. Nonmonotone selection: there exist two threshold types, pj and pk, p1 < pj  pk < pn, such
that s⇤(pi) = 0 for all pi < pj, s⇤(pr) = 1 for all pj  pr  pk, and s⇤(pl) = 0 for all pl > pk,
and the equilibrium set of contracts is
C⇤ =
(
Ipub =
 
(1  ⌘) d  LpL +
Pk
r=j  rpr
 LyL +
Pk
r=j  ryH
y, ⌘
!
, Ipriv = (pi (1   i) d,  i)i2{i:s⇤(pi)=0}
)
,
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where Iprivi = (pi(1   i)d,  i) is the private contract which will be chosen by type pi.
The equilibrium schedule of private contracts satisfies the following: (i) uniqueness: Ipriv is
unique, (ii) no distortion at the top: if s⇤(pn) = 0, then  n = 0, (iii) distortion at the bottom: if
s⇤(pi) = 0 and pi < pn, then  i > 0, (iv) incentive compatibility: if s⇤(pi) = s⇤(pi+1) = 0, then
U [(pi+1(1  i+1)d,  i+1), pi+1] = U [(pi(1  i)d,  i), pi+1], and if s⇤(pi) = 0 and s⇤(pi+1) = 1, then
U(Ipub, pi+1) = U [(pi(1    i)d,  i), pi+1], (v) monotonicity: if s⇤(pi) = s⇤(pj) = 0 and pj > pi,
then  j <  i, and (vi) positive insurance: if s⇤(pi) = 0, then  i < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. I proceed in a series of steps. In Steps 1-2, I prove the properties of the
equilibrium strategy profile. In Steps 3-10, I prove the properties of the equilibrium private
contract schedule. Finally, in Step 11, I provide a numerical example which shows that the two
scenarios outlined in Proposition 2 can occur in an equilibrium under asymmetric information.
In any case, the contribution rate for public insurance, ⌧ , follows directly from the equilibrium
strategy profile and the balanced budget condition in equation (1.1).
Step 1. I first prove that s⇤(p1) = 0. By Lemma 5, it suffices to show that public insurance
is always actuarially unfavourable for p1, which has been shown above.
Step 2. I now show that the types who join public insurance in equilibrium are connected,
in the sense that there do not exist pi, pj, and pk, pi < pj < pk, such that s⇤(pi) = s⇤(pk) = 1 and
s⇤(pj) = 0. Suppose, by contradiction, that the contrary is true. Let I be the private contract
that pj selects in equilibrium, and let W IA and W INA be the final wealths corresponding to I.
As I and Ipub are available to all types, the following three inequalities must hold:
piu
⇣
W pubA
⌘
+ (1  pi)u
⇣
W pubNA
⌘
  piu
 
W IA
 
+ (1  pi)u
 
W INA
 
. (1.6)
pju
⇣
W pubA
⌘
+ (1  pj)u
⇣
W pubNA
⌘
< pju
 
W IA
 
+ (1  pj)u
 
W INA
 
. (1.7)
pku
⇣
W pubA
⌘
+ (1  pk)u
⇣
W pubA
⌘
  pku
 
W IA
 
+ (1  pk)u
 
W IA
 
. (1.8)
Subtracting (1.6) from (1.7) and dividing by pj   pi yields
u
⇣
W pubA
⌘
  u
⇣
W pubNA
⌘
< u
 
W IA
   u  W INA  . (1.9)
Subtracting (1.7) from (1.8) and dividing by pk   pj yields
u
⇣
W pubA
⌘
  u
⇣
W pubNA
⌘
> u
 
W IA
   u  W INA  ;
contradicting (1.9). Steps 1 and 2 together imply that only the two scenarios described in
Proposition 2 are possible equilibrium strategy profiles.
Step 3. I now show that no private contract pools two or more risks in equilibrium. Sup-
pose, by contradiction, that there exists a private contract I = (↵,  ) 2 C⇤ which is chosen by
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a set of risks P ✓ {p1, . . . , pn}, with |P |   2. Denote p = min(P ) and let N = {i : pi 2 P}.
Since I 2 C⇤, I generates nonnegative profits:
⇡ (I, P ) =
X
i2N
 i [↵  pi (1   ) d]   0.
Solving for ↵ and noting that |P |   2, we have that:
⇡
 
I, p
 
= ↵  p (1   ) d   (1   ) d
✓P
i2N  ipiP
i2N  i
  p
◆
> (1   ) d
✓
p
P
i2N  iP
i2N  i
  p
◆
= 0.
That is, I generates strictly positive profits if sold exclusively to type p. By Lemma 2, p’s
indifference curve through I is steeper than those of all types in the set P \ {p}. Thus by
Lemma 2 and the continuity of ⇡(·, p), there exists a contract I 0 = (↵0,  0), with ↵0 < ↵ and
 0 >  , such that U(I 0, p) > U(I, p), U(I 0, pi) < U(I, pi) for all pi 2 P \ {p}, and ⇡(I 0, p) > 0.
Since I 0 /2 C⇤, for if I 0 2 C⇤ then p would not choose I, the third condition for equilibrium is
violated; contradiction.
Step 4. I now show that no private contract generates strictly positive profits in equi-
librium. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a contract I = (↵,  ) 2 C⇤ which
generates strictly positive profits. By Step 3 and the definition of C⇤, I must be chosen
by one and only one type. Let this type be pi. By Lemma 2 and the continuity of ⇡(·, pi),
there exists a contract I 0 = (↵0,  0), with ↵0 < ↵ and  0 >  , such that U(I 0, pi) > U(I, pi),
U(I 0, pj) < U(I, pj)  maxI002C⇤ U(I 00, pj) for all pj > pi, and ⇡(I 0, pi) > 0. Since I 0 /2 C⇤, for if
I 0 2 C⇤ then pi would not choose I, the third condition for equilibrium is violated; contradic-
tion. This implies that the private equilibrium contracts are of the form Iprivi = (pi(1  i)d,  i).
Step 5. To show that there is no distortion at the top, suppose, by contradiction, that
s⇤(pn) = 0 and Iprivn = (pn(1    n)d,  n) with  n > 0. Because of Lemma 3, any contract
I 0 = (pn(1    0n)d,  0n) with  0n <  n guarantees that U(I 0, pn) > U(Iprivn , pn). The contract I 0,
if offered, will be chosen by consumers with risk pn or lower, thus generating nonnegative
profits. This violates the third condition for equilibrium; contradiction.
Step 6. To show that there is distortion at the bottom, suppose, by contradiction, that
s⇤(pi) = 0 for some pi < pn and Iprivi = (pid, 0). Consider the type pn. Either s⇤(pn) = 0 or
s⇤(pn) = 1. Suppose the former is true. We know, by Step 5, that Iprivn = (pnd, 0), implying
that U(Iprivn , pn) < U(I
priv
i , pn). Hence, the contract intended for pi will also be chosen by pn.
Since all contracts must be separating (Step 3), this leads to a contradiction. Suppose now
that s⇤(pn) = 1. In this case, we must have that U(Ipub, pn)   u(yH   pid). We must also have
that U(Ipub, pi) < u(yH   pid), since s⇤(pi) = 0. But since pi < pn, U(Ipub, pi) > U(Ipub, pn),
contradicting the two preceding inequalities.
Step 7. Before I show that incentive compatibility has to hold with equality, note that
local incentive compatibility (IC) constraints are necessary, since contracts have to be sepa-
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rating, and sufficient, since expected utility satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees strict single cross-
ing property. Suppose now, by contradiction, that some local IC constraint is not binding,
i.e., maxI2C⇤ U(I, pi+1) > U(Iprivi , pi+1) for some pi such that s⇤(pi) = 0, where I
priv
i =
(pi(1    i)d,  i). Either s⇤(pi+1) = 0 or s⇤(pi+1) = 1. Suppose the former is true. Then,
U(Iprivi+1 , pi+1) > U(I
priv
i , pi+1), where I
priv
i+1 = (pi+1(1    i+1)d,  i+1) by the preceding steps.
By Lemma 3 and the continuity of U (·, pi+1), there exists a contract I 0 = (pi(1    0i)d,  0i),
with  0i <  i, such that U(I
priv
i+1 , pi+1) > U(I
0, pi+1) and U(I 0, pi) > U(Iprivi , pi). The contract
I 0, if offered, will be chosen by consumers with risk pi or lower and generate nonnegative
profits. This violates the third condition for equilibrium; contradiction. Suppose now that
s⇤(pi+1) = 1. Then, U(Ipub, pi+1) > U(Iprivi , pi+1). By Lemma 3 and the continuity of U (·, pi+1),
there exists a contract I 0 = (pi(1    0i)d,  0i), with  0i <  i, such that U(Ipub, pi+1) > U(I 0, pi+1)
and U(I 0, pi) > U(Iprivi , pi). The contract I 0, if offered, will be chosen by consumers with risk
pi or lower and generate nonnegative profits. This violates the third condition for equilibrium;
contradiction.
Step 8. To show that monotonicity has to hold, suppose, by contradiction, that s⇤(pi) =
s⇤(pj) = 0 for some pj > pi, and  j    i . We have that
U [(pi (1   i) d,  i) , pj] = pju [yH    id  pi (1   i) d] + (1  pj)u [yH   pi (1   i) d]
> pju [yH    id  pj (1   i) d] + (1  pj)u [yH   pj (1   i) d]
  pju [yH    jd  pj (1   j) d] + (1  pj)u [yH   pj (1   j) d]
= U [(pj (1   j) d,  j) , pj] ,
where the first inequality follows from pj > pi and the second inequality follows from  j    i
and Lemma 3. This violates incentive compatibility; contradiction.
Step 9. Uniqueness of the private contract schedule follows from the fact that U [(pi(1  
 i)d,  i), pi+1] is strictly decreasing in  i, as shown in Lemma 3, so that there is exactly one  i
such that incentive compatibility is satisfied with equality.
Step 10. I now show that every private contract which is chosen in equilibrium entails
positive insurance. Suppose, by contradiction, that s⇤(pi) = 0 and  i = 1 for some pi < pn
(remember that  n = 0). Either s⇤(pi+1) = 0 or s⇤(pi+1) = 1. Suppose the former is true. It
follows from Step 8 that  i+1 < 1. But then,
U [(pi+1 (1   i+1) d,  i+1) , pi+1]
= pi+1u [yH    i+1d  pi+1 (1   i+1) d] + (1  pi+1)u (yH   pi+1 (1   i+1) d)
> pi+1u (yH   d) + (1  pi+1)u (yH) = U [(pi (1   i) d,  i) , pi+1] ,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3. This violates the requirement that incentive
compatibility has to be satisfied with equality; contradiction.
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Suppose now that s⇤(pi+1) = 1. If ⌘ = 1, then a contradiction follows immediately, since
s⇤(pi) = 0 requires that U(Ipub, pi) < U [(pi(1   i)d,  i), pi], but Ipub = (pi(1   i)d,  i) = (0, 1).
If ⌘ < 1, then
U
 
Ipub, pi+1
 
= U [(⌧yH , ⌘) , pi+1]
  U [(pi+1(1  ⌘)d, ⌘) , pi+1]
> U [(pi(1  ⌘)d, ⌘) , pi+1]
> U [(0, 1) , pi+1]
= U [(pi(1   i)d,  i) , pi+1] ,
where the first and third inequality follow from Lemma 5 and Lemma 3, respectively. This
violates the requirement that incentive compatibility has to be satisfied with equality; contra-
diction.
Step 11. Suppose there are three types and u(x) = ln(x). Let the parameters be those
reported in Table 1.5. The co-insurance rate under public insurance, ⌘, is left undetermined.
Table 1.5: Parameterisation
Population shares Risks Incomes & loss
 L 0.6 pL 0.35 yH 1
 1 0.05 p1 0.3 yL 0.9
 2 0.1 p2 0.5 d 0.8
 3 0.25 p3 0.6
Consider first the private sector in isolation. The three candidate-to-equilibrium contracts
are Ipriv3 = (0.48, 0), I
priv
2 = (0.4(1    2),  2), and Ipriv1 = (0.24(1    1),  1), where  1 and  2
satisfy the following two incentive-compatibility constraints:
U
 
Ipriv3 , p3
 
= U
 
Ipriv2 , p3
 
. (1.10)
U
 
Ipriv2 , p2
 
= U
 
Ipriv1 , p2
 
. (1.11)
(1.10) and (1.11) are jointly satisfied for  2 ⇡ 0.5361 and  1 ⇡ 0.7625. It can easily be shown
that there does not exist a pooling contract which can break the separating equilibrium, i.e.,
a private sector equilibrium exists.
Now focus on the public plan. In equilibrium, the contribution rate must satisfy
⌧ = (1  ⌘) 0.80.6 · 0.35 + 0.05 · 0.3s
⇤ (p1) + 0.1 · 0.5s⇤ (p2) + 0.25 · 0.6s⇤ (p3)
0.6 · 0.9 + 0.05s⇤ (p1) + 0.1s⇤ (p2) + 0.25s⇤ (p3) .
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Consider an equilibrium with adverse selection in which the high and medium risks join
public insurance and the low risks purchase private insurance: s⇤(p1) = 0, s⇤(p2) = s⇤(p3) = 1.
In this case, it must be that ⌧ = 164(1 ⌘)/445. If ⌧ = 164(1 ⌘)/445, then s⇤(p2) = s⇤(p3) = 1
if and only if the following two inequalities are satisfied:
U
 
Ipriv3 , p3
   0.6 ln 1  0.8⌘   164
445
(1  ⌘)
 
+ 0.4 ln

1  164
445
(1  ⌘)
 
.
U
 
Ipriv2 , p2
   0.5 ln 1  0.8⌘   164
445
(1  ⌘)
 
+ 0.5 ln

1  164
445
(1  ⌘)
 
.
The two inequalities are satisfied if ⌘  0.5956. Given that s⇤(p2) = 1, the incentive
compatibility constraint that determines Ipriv1 = (0.24(1   1),  1) is now given by
U
 
Ipriv1 , p2
 
= 0.5 ln

1  0.8⌘   164
445
(1  ⌘)
 
+ 0.5 ln

1  164
445
(1  ⌘)
 
.
Solving, we obtain that  1 =  1(⌘) = (5
p
165312⌘2 + 41307⌘ + 300325   1691)/1869, which
is increasing in ⌘. In conclusion, for ⌘  0.5956, there exists an equilibrium with s⇤(p1) = 0,
s⇤(p2) = 1, and s⇤(p3) = 1. The corresponding equilibrium set of contracts is C⇤ = {Ipub =
(164(1  ⌘)y/445, ⌘), Ipriv1 = (0.24(1   1(⌘)),  1(⌘))}.
Now consider the unique equilibrium scenario with nonmonotone selection, in which the
medium risks join public insurance and the low and high risks join private insurance: s⇤(p1) =
s⇤(p3) = 0, s⇤(p2) = 1. In this case, it must be that ⌧ = 0.325 (1  ⌘). If ⌧ = 0.325(1  ⌘), then
s⇤(p3) = 0 and s⇤(p2) = 1 if and only if the following two inequalities are satisfied:
U
 
Ipriv3 , p3
 
> 0.6 ln [1  0.8⌘   0.325 (1  ⌘)] + 0.4 ln [1  0.325 (1  ⌘)] .
U
 
Ipriv2 , p2
   0.5 ln [1  0.8⌘   0.325 (1  ⌘)] + 0.5 ln [1  0.325 (1  ⌘)] .
The two inequalities are satisfied if 0.6547  ⌘  0.6844. The private contract which is in-
tended for p1 is given by Ipriv1 = (0.24(1  1(⌘)),  1(⌘)), where  1(⌘) = (5
p
5187⌘2 + 3402⌘ + 7795 
304)/336 solves U(Ipriv1 , p2) = 0.5 ln[1   0.8⌘   0.325(1  ⌘)] + 0.5 ln[1   0.325(1  ⌘)]. In con-
clusion, for 0.6547  ⌘  0.6844, there exists an equilibrium with s⇤(p1) = 0, s⇤(p3) = 0,
and s⇤(p2) = 1. The corresponding equilibrium set of contracts is given by C⇤ = {Ipub =
(0.325(1  ⌘)y, ⌘), Ipriv1 = (0.24(1   1(⌘)),  1(⌘)), Ipriv3 = (0.48, 0)}. Note that public insurance
is advantageously selected in this case, given that Ep[pd | s⇤(p) = 1] = 0.5 < 0.5375 = Ep[pd].
It can moreover be shown that there is a unique equilibrium with s⇤ = 0 whenever ⌘  
0.7009.
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1.B Robustness Checks
1.B.1 Magnitude of Selection
Table 1.6: Robustness checks: Magnitude of selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: No controls
⇢ˆ -0.152*** -0.169*** -0.108*** -0.173*** -0.144*** -0.150**
Wald test of ⇢ = 0 (p-value) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013)
Panel B: Control for observables
⇢ˆ -0.079 -0.098 -0.046 -0.131** -0.102* -0.109
Wald test of ⇢ = 0 (p-value) (0.235) (0.167) (0.291) (0.020) (0.062) (0.118)
N 8,366 6,681 11,892 12,787 10,677 4,741
Notes: Table reports the correlation of the residuals from bivariate probit estimations of equations (1.2)
and (1.3). Panel A reports the correlations for the model with b = c = 0. Panel B reports the correlations
for the model with c = 0. Column 1 shows estimates after controlling for a summary indicator of chronic
conditions, body mass index, and physical and mental component scales. Column 2 shows estimates after
controlling for indicators for 9 chronic conditions, body mass index, and physical and mental component
scales. The dependent variable HOSPITAL in column 3 is an indicator which equals one if an individual is
hospitalised in period t + 1 or t + 2. The dependent variable HOSPITAL in column 4 is an indicator which
equals one if an individual stays 3 or more nights in the hospital in period t+1. Column 5 shows estimates
after excluding individuals with zero income (civil servants and the self-employed) and restricts the income
sample to those individuals with more than 5,000 Euros above the compulsory insurance threshold. Column
6 shows estimates for the subsample of individuals who are in the first or second year of being eligible to
choose private insurance. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
43
1.B.2 Sources of Selection
Table 1.7: Robustness checks: Sources of selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: OPTOUT
Self-assessed health 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Risk aversion -0.002 -0.003 -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** -0.006**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
West Germany -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.044***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
Dependent variable: HOSPITAL
Self-assessed health -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.042*** -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.016**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Risk aversion -0.004* -0.006** -0.005* -0.003* -0.004* -0.006*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
West Germany -0.005 -0.006 -0.013 -0.014* -0.010 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
N 8,193 6,676 11,381 12,019 10,048 4,189
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of the unused observables from bivariate probit estimations of
equations (1.2) and (1.3). Column 1 shows estimates after controlling for a summary indicator of chronic condi-
tions, body mass index, and physical and mental component scales. Column 2 shows estimates after controlling
for indicators for 9 chronic conditions, body mass index, and physical and mental component scales. The depen-
dent variable HOSPITAL in column 3 is an indicator which equals one if an individual is hospitalised in period
t + 1 or t + 2. The dependent variable HOSPITAL in column 4 is an indicator which equals one if an individual
stays 3 or more nights in the hospital in period t+1. Column 5 shows estimates after excluding individuals with
zero income (civil servants and self-employed) and restricts the income sample to those individuals with more
than 5,000 Euros above the compulsory insurance threshold. Column 6 shows estimates for the subsample of in-
dividuals who are in the first or second year of being eligible to choose private insurance. Means of OPTOUT and
HOSPITAL vary across columns. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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1.B.3 Testing for Asymmetric Information
Table 1.8: Robustness checks: Testing for asymmetric information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: OPTOUT
SAH=1 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.010 0.011 0.010
(0.027) (0.033) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.039)
SAH=2 (omitted) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
— — — — — —
SAH=3 0.009 0.017* 0.012 0.014* 0.016* 0.032**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
SAH=4 0.013 0.016* 0.012* 0.014** 0.014* 0.035**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
SAH=5 0.023* 0.028** 0.016* 0.022** 0.023** 0.041**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014)
Dependent variable: HOSPITAL
SAH=1 0.012 0.074 0.057 0.062 0.064 0.017
(0.037) (0.068) (0.043) (0.032) (0.037) (0.048)
SAH=2 (omitted) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
— — — — — —
SAH=3 -0.048*** -0.049** -0.063*** -0.039*** -0.035** -0.032*
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
SAH=4 -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.107*** -0.063*** -0.068*** -0.043**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016)
SAH=5 -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.125*** -0.072*** -0.076*** -0.053**
(0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018)
N 8,363 6,676 11,820 12,777 10,668 4,737
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of the five categories of self-assessed health from bivariate probit
estimations of equations (1.2) and (1.3). 1=very bad, 2=bad, 3=satisfactory, 4=good, 5=very good. Column 1
shows estimates after controlling for a summary indicator of chronic conditions, body mass index, and physical
and mental component scales. Column 2 shows estimates after controlling for indicators for 9 chronic conditions,
body mass index, and physical and mental component scales. The dependent variable HOSPITAL in column 3 is
an indicator which equals one if an individual is hospitalised in period t + 1 or t + 2. The dependent variable
HOSPITAL in column 4 is an indicator which equals one if an individual stays 3 or more nights in the hospital
in period t + 1. Column 5 shows estimates after excluding individuals with zero income (civil servants and
self-employed) and restricts the income sample to those individuals with more than 5,000 Euros above the
compulsory insurance threshold. Column 6 shows estimates for the subsample of individuals who are in the first
or second year of being eligible to choose private insurance. Means of OPTOUT and HOSPITAL vary across
columns. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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2 Do Doctors Prescribe Antibiotics Out of Fear of Malprac-
tice?
2.1 Introduction
Doctors in the U.S. (and elsewhere) prescribe too many antibiotics. According to recent es-
timates, up to 50% of antibiotics prescribed in the ambulatory care setting are inappropriate
(CDC 2013). The misuse of antibiotics promotes the growth of antibiotic resistance, which
is one of the most pressing public health issues that many developed countries face today.
Worldwide, at least 700,000 patients die every year because of antibiotic resistance, and
many more become infected with antibiotic-resistant bacteria (O’Neill 2014). In light of this,
the question becomes, why do doctors prescribe unnecessary antibiotics?
A possible explanation for why U.S. doctors prescribe so many antibiotics lies in the med-
ical malpractice system. Doctors in the U.S. face considerable liability pressure as about one
in 14 is sued in every given year (Jena et al. 2011). In response to this pressure, doctors
have been found to resort to defensive medicine, that is, to administer tests, treatments, or
medications with expected benefits below cost in order to protect themselves against poten-
tial legal proceedings (see the review by Kessler et al. 2006). The frequent use of antibiotics
may constitute a form of defensive medicine: doctors may feel inclined to prescribe an antibi-
otic against their own clinical judgement because the antibiotic presents a safeguard against
serious bacterial infections, which may trigger a malpractice claim if left untreated. Anec-
dotal evidence and physician surveys support this theory,17 but, to date, no attempt has been
made to examine whether liability pressure plays a role in actual clinical decisions to prescribe
antibiotics.
This paper is the first to systematically analyze the impact of liability pressure on antibiotic
prescriptions. I begin by constructing a stylized model of antibiotic prescribing under the
threat of malpractice. Based on patient symptoms, a physician has to decide whether or not
to prescribe an antibiotic, taking into account the patient’s expected utility; expected medical
liability costs; and the external cost of increased antibiotic resistance. The model shows that
an increase in liability pressure can lead to an increase or decrease in antibiotic prescriptions,
depending on how much of a bias the tort law introduces towards (or against, for that matter)
prescribing antibiotics relative to what the physician would choose in its absence. Given
that two arguably realistic assumptions are satisfied, the model says that direction of the
change in antibiotic prescriptions after a change in liability pressure is informative of the
social wastefulness of these antibiotics. As such, the model gives rise to a test of defensive
17For instance, of the 669 physicians who participated in a survey in Pennsylvania, 33% reported that they
frequently prescribe more medication than medically indicated in response to liability pressure, and an additional
36% reported that they occasionally prescribe medication to avoid potential litigation (Studdert et al. 2005).
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medicine whose only requirement is an estimate of the causal effect of liability pressure on
antibiotic prescriptions.
Using data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS), a nationally
representative sample of visits to office-based physicians in the U.S., I estimate the causal
effect of liability pressure on antibiotic prescriptions with a difference-in-differences design
based on the variation in tort reforms across U.S. states from 1993 to 2011. I allow for
heterogenous responses to reforms across doctors and patients, for example, based on the
patient’s type of health insurance or the physician’s specialty. Throughout the analysis, I
carefully consider the possibility that preexisting trends in the medical care sector cause tort
reforms and not vice versa.
Results show that doctors respond to liability pressure by prescribing more antibiotics.
After the introduction of a cap on noneconomic damages – a commonly adopted tort reform
that reduces the liability pressure on physicians – doctors are about 6 percent less likely to
prescribe antibiotics. Extrapolating to the U.S. population, I estimate that, per year, there
would be 3.2 million fewer ambulatory care visits in which doctors prescribe antibiotics if all
states adopted caps on noneconomic damages. Results also show that doctors do not prescribe
less drugs per patient visit, suggesting that doctors substitute other drugs for antibiotics when
they face less liability pressure. Indeed, I find that doctors prescribe more antitussives – a form
of cough medication that often represents a more effective treatment than antibiotics in cases
of upper respiratory tract infections – after the enactment of noneconomic damages caps.
With regard to potential heterogeneous effects of noneconomic damages cap reforms, I find
that patients aged 65 and above are not affected by noneconomic damages caps. This can be
explained by the fact that older patients pose less of a malpractice risk to physicians because
of lower future earnings losses. Other factors that have previously been identified to lead to
heterogeneous responses to tort reforms – such as patients being insured by Medicaid, the
physician’s specialty, and HMO ownership of the practice – do not play a role in determining
antibiotic prescriptions after noneconomic damages cap reforms.
Adopting the same difference-in-differences strategy as described above but using data
from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS), I investigate whether noneconomic damages
cap reforms lead to a change in hospital stays for conditions that can be prevented through
the timely use of antibiotics. Following the medical literature, I focus on the following six
health outcomes that can be linked to antibiotic use in the outpatient setting: peritonsillar ab-
scess, rheumatic fever, mastoiditis, septicemia, pneumonia, and meningitis. By and large, the
empirical evidence indicates that noneconomic damages caps do not affect hospital discharges
for such conditions.
Taken together, the empirical results, as well as the theoretical model, suggest that liability
pressure induces physicians to prescribe antibiotics that have no clear health benefits, or
in other words, that physicians use antibiotics as defensive medicine. While the monetary
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cost of defensive medication treatments may be small compared to other cases of defensive
medicine (after all, antibiotics are relatively cheap), there is also the indirect cost tied to
increased antibiotic resistance. In this regard, antibiotics are a particularly alarming case of
defensive medicine, given that defensively used antibiotics do not only constitute a waste
of resources but also negatively affect the health of others due to their external effect on
antibiotic resistance.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides background infor-
mation and references to the relevant literatures. Section 2.3 presents the theory. Section
2.4 describes the data and provides summary statistics. Section 2.5 explains the empirical
strategy. Section 2.6 presents the empirical results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Antibiotic Resistance
Antibiotics are used to treat bacterial infections and represent one of the most important
tools in modern medicine. Antibiotics are essential for many medical procedures, including
chemotherapy, dialysis, Cesarean sections, and organ transplants, because of their ability to
prevent infectious complications in vulnerable patients. Antibiotics are also used in the hus-
bandry of livestock, partially, to promote the growth of animals; a practice that has recently
come under scrutiny.
The efficacy of antibiotics cannot be taken for granted. Bacteria evolve and develop mech-
anisms to resist the antibiotics that are used to combat them. Over the course of the last
20 years, antibiotic resistance has become an increasingly alarming issue due to the com-
bination of two major factors: a sharp increase in antibiotic consumption and a shortage
of new antibiotics to replace those which have become ineffective. Today, it is estimated
that over 2 million U.S. residents acquire antibiotic-resistant infections in a given year, and
that these infections result in more than 23,000 annual deaths (CDC 2013). Mortality from
MRSA (methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus), which is just one of many microorgan-
isms that have developed resistance to antibiotics, exceeds mortality due to asthma, homicide,
or HIV/AIDS (Klevens et al. 2007, CDC 2015). The economic impact of antibiotic resistance,
while difficult to measure, is likely to be huge: estimates of the cost of antibiotic resistance
range from 55 billion USD per year for the U.S. economy alone to 100 trillion USD for the
world economy until 2050 (CDC 2013, O’Neill 2014). In response to this growing problem,
many influential institutions, among them the World Health Organization and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, have issued reports and called for action to combat the rise
in antibiotic resistance (WHO 2014, CDC 2013).
Any use of antibiotics, no matter how conservative and appropriate, contributes to the
development of resistant bacteria. But, the widespread misuse of antibiotics that we observe
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in practice, for example for acute respiratory tract infections such as the common cold, makes
the problem worse. For the U.S., which is among the countries with the highest per capita
consumption of antibiotics in the world (Van Boeckel et al. 2014), it is estimated that be-
tween 25 and 50% of all antibiotics are prescribed unnecessarily (CDC 2013, Shapiro et al.
2014).18 Furthermore, there exist large differences in antibiotic usage across U.S. states, with
some states prescribing twice as many antibiotics on a per capita basis as others (Hicks et al.
2013). Finally, even if antibiotics are indicated for treatment, physicians often prescribe non-
recommended broad-spectrum antibiotics, which contribute more to the growth in antibiotic
resistance, instead of relying on equally effective (and cheaper) narrow-spectrum antibiotics
(Linder and Stafford 2001).
The question is, why do physicians prescribe so many antibiotics? Prior research has
shown that physicians prescribe more antibiotics if they can benefit financially from prescrib-
ing (Currie et al. 2014), patient expectations play an important role (Mangione-Smith et al.
1999), peer effects matter (Kwon and Jun 2015), and provider competition can encourage
antibiotic use (Fogelberg 2014). One lesson that can be drawn from these findings from dif-
ferent countries is that physicians are influenced by the institutional setup of the healthcare
system they practice in. Physicians who practice in the U.S. generally invoke three reasons
why they prescribe antibiotics that may not be clinically indicated: patient pressure, to end
the visit rapidly, and to avoid potential litigation (Bauchner et al. 1999). The latter reason is
the focus of this study and will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.
2.2.2 Liability for Medical Malpractice and Defensive Medicine
In most countries around the world, patients can sue the attending physician when they
suffer harm. In the U.S., liability for medical malpractice is generally based on the negligence
standard. To prove a case of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the care
that he or she received fell below the standard of care that is expected from physicians in
the community, (2) the care that he or she received was performed negligently, and (3) there
is a causal connection between the injury that he or she suffers from and the care that the
physician provided.
Even though many adverse events that are caused by medical negligence do not result in
the patient filing a malpractice claim (Localio et al. 1991), physicians in the U.S. still have
to defend a large amount of claims each year. Jena et al. (2011) estimate that 7.4% of all
physicians are sued in a given year, and that the lifetime risk of being sued ranges between
75% and 99%, depending on physician specialty. Defending a malpractice claim is costly for
physicians mainly because there are large nonmonetary costs that are associated with being
18On top of promoting the growth of antibiotic resistance, inappropriately prescribed antibiotics directly cost
the U.S. healthcare system more than $1.1 billion per year (Fendrick et al. 2003) and lead to a myriad of
preventable adverse drug reactions (CDC 2013).
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sued, two of which are particularly important. First, physicians have to devote a considerable
amount of time to defending malpractice claims. Seabury et al. (2013) show that the average
physician spends more than four years with an unresolved malpractice claim, and Studdert
et al. (2006) report that the average time between injury and closure of a claim is five years.
Second, a malpractice incidence can severely damage a physician’s reputation, and as Dra-
nove et al. (2012) have shown, such reputational damages are associated with economically
significant costs. Direct monetary costs arise relatively seldom from a malpractice claim, as
most physicians are fully insured against malpractice risks (Danzon 2000, Zeiler et al. 2007).
For this reason, physicians should care more about the probability of being sued than awards.
One goal of liability for medical malpractice is to align the interests of physicians and
other healthcare providers with those of patients: by punishing healthcare professionals for
providing too little care, liability is supposed to reduce adverse health outcomes. However, as
we know since at least from Kessler and McClellan (1996), liability can also induce physicians
to provide too much care. This is referred to as defensive medicine, which, in the economics
literature, is defined as care that physicians order to avoid lawsuits but for which cost ex-
ceeds expected benefits. The empirical evidence suggests that physicians practice defensive
medicine by increasing treatment intensity for heart attack patients (Kessler and McClellan
1996, Avraham and Schanzenbach 2015) and ordering more imaging services (Baicker et al.
2007). The evidence regarding the rates of Cesarean sections, whose excessive use is of-
ten attributed to liability pressure, is less conclusive: while Dubay et al. (1999) and Shurtz
(2013) find that physicians perform more Cesarean sections following an increase in liability
pressure, Currie and MacLeod (2008) and Amaral-Garcia et al. (2015) find the opposite.
Whether physicians prescribe medication to protect themselves against potential malprac-
tice claims has not yet been investigated in actual clinical situations. Errors of medication
are a common cause of medical misadventures and often lead to malpractice claims (Leape
et al. 1991, Rothschild et al. 2002). Not surprisingly therefore, two questionnaire surveys
suggest that about a third of physicians regularly prescribe more medication in response to
liability pressure (Summerton 1995, Studdert et al. 2006). In the context of antibiotics, it
is clear that not prescribing an antibiotic to a patient with a bacterial infection can trigger a
malpractice claim against the physician, for example when the patient suffers from pneumo-
nia or meningitis.19 Adding to this, it is often difficult for physicians to differentially diagnose
between conditions that require an antibiotic and those that do not (Coenen et al. 2000). As
antibiotics are relatively safe and inexpensive, physicians may be inclined to prescribe them in
marginal cases and even when an antibiotic is not clinically indicated. However, prescribing
antibiotics bears the risk of adverse drug reactions, which may as well lead to a malpractice
19There exist numerous examples of malpractice claims in which patients sue their physician for delaying
or denying antibiotic treatment; see, for example, Pasquale v. Miller (1993), Gartner v. Hemmer (2002), and
Burgess v. Mt. Vernon Developmental Center (2009). Moreover, by prescribing an antibiotic, physicians can also
hope to avoid malpractice claims which are based on a failure to diagnose a bacterial infection.
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claim. Hence, when it is clear that the patient does not require an antibiotic, physicians are
better off not prescribing one when they want to minimize the risk of litigation.
Another open question is whether liability pressure affects the type of antibiotics that
physicians prescribe. One may expect that physicians who are worried about potential mal-
practice claims prescribe relatively more broad-spectrum antibiotics, given that these act
against a wider range of bacteria than narrow-spectrum antibiotics.20 On the other hand,
physicians may also prefer to prescribe narrow-spectrum to the marginal patient given that
narrow-spectrum antibiotics are cheaper, generally cause less side effects, and contribute less
to the growth in antibiotic resistance than broad-spectrum antibiotics.
2.2.3 Tort Reform
The terms on which patients in the U.S. can sue their physician are determined by the tort
law, which differs across states. Spurred in part by three major medical malpractice crises (in
the 1970s, 1980s, and 2000s), most states have reformed their tort laws to keep malpractice
insurance from becoming unaffordable and to mitigate the liability pressure on physicians.
The following four are the most commonly adopted reforms over the period from 1993 to
2011.
1. Caps on noneconomic damages: Noneconomic damages are awarded for nonpecuniary
harms, such as pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and emotional distress. They ac-
count for about 50% of the typical medical malpractice award (Hyman et al. 2009) and
are often controversial, given that nonmonetary losses are inherently hard to quantify.
Following the example of California, which introduced a cap of $250,000 in 1975, the
majority of states have now adopted caps on noneconomic damages.
2. Caps on punitive damages: Punitive damages are designed to punish tortfeasors and
deter misconduct. As they are usually restricted to cases that involve intent, actual
malice, or gross negligence, punitive damages are awarded relatively infrequently in
medical malpractice cases. Many states cap the amount of punitive damages that can
be awarded, where the cap can be a fixed amount, a ratio between punitive damages
and compensatory damages that cannot be exceed, an amount that is determined by
the defendant’s net worth or income, or a combination thereof. Some states, such as
Michigan, do not allow for punitive damages unless they are specifically provided by
statute, and other states, such as Nebraska, impose an outright ban on punitive damages.
3. Modifications of the collateral-source rule (CSR): The common law CSR prohibits the
admission of evidence that the plaintiff has been compensated for his or her losses from
20For example, in McIntiry v. Stubbs (1983), the physician prescribed narrow-spectrum antibiotics, which did
not cure the patient’s meningitis, and was sued for failing to prescribe broad-spectrum antibiotics.
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sources other than the defendant, such as the plaintiff’s health insurance. Tort reform
advocates argue that the rule allows plaintiff to be compensated twice for the same
injury and lobby for its abrogation. In fact, the majority of states have now altered or
abolished the common law CSR.
4. Modifications of the joint-and-several liability (JSL) rule: Under the common law JSL
rule, plaintiffs can recover damages from multiple defendants collectively or from each
defendant individually, regardless of the shares of liability that are apportioned to the
defendants. If a plaintiff recovers all damages from one defendant, it is then up to this
defendant to pursue the other defendants to contribute for their respective shares of the
liability. More than two-thirds of states have limited the application of JSL or replaced
it with the proportionate liability rule, under which defendants cannot be asked to pay
for more than what they are responsible for.
A large body of research investigates the effect of tort reforms on the medical malpractice
environment.21 The conclusion that has emerged from this literature is that caps on noneco-
nomic damages are the only reform with a significant and consistent impact on liability pres-
sure: they reduce jury awards (Hyman et al. 2009), settlement amounts (Avraham 2007,
Friedson and Kniesner 2012), claim frequency (Avraham 2007, Waters et al. 2007, Paik et al.
2013), and insurance premiums (Thorpe 2004, Kilgore et al. 2006), giving rise to an overall
reduction in liability pressure. Other reforms, including caps on punitive damages and modi-
fications of the collateral-source and joint-and-several liability rule, have no significant impact
on payments or claim frequency, or they increase one and decrease the other.
Several pieces of evidence suggest that changes in the tort law are not related to specific
trends in medical care, such as antibiotic prescribing rates, which is crucial for the empirical
analysis. First, political factors, such as the political power of the Republican party, appear
to be the main drivers of tort reform, whereas private interest groups, including physician
associations, do not play an important role (Deng and Zanjani 2016, Matter and Stutzer
2015). Second, most tort reforms affect all kinds of torts equally and are not limited to
medical malpractice cases. In fact, many of the reforms concerning punitive damages are
an indirect consequence of the public debate revolving around frivolous litigation and the
infamous hot coffee lawsuit (Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, 1992). Finally, many tort
reforms have been ruled unconstitutional by state supreme courts. These court rulings are
plausibly exogenous to trends in medical care and will be exploited in the empirical analysis.
21For two excellent surveys of the literature until the early 2000s, see Holtz-Eakin (2004) and Mello (2006).
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2.3 A Model of Prescriptions under the Threat of Malpractice
This section introduces a model of the physician’s decision to prescribe an antibiotic under the
threat of malpractice. The physician (she) sees a patient (he) who suffers from an infection,
i. The infection is either viral (i = v) or bacterial (i = b), but the physician does not observe
i. Instead she observes the patient’s symptoms, from which she can infer the risk that the
infection is bacterial, r = Pr(i = b).
Based on the patient’s symptoms, the physician has to decide whether to prescribe an
antibiotic (a = 1) or not (a = 0). She chooses a to maximize her expected utility,
V (a, r | law) = U (a, r)  L (a, r | law)   a,
where U(a, r) = ru(a | i = b) + (1   r)u(a | i = v) is the patient’s expected utility; L(a, r |
law) = rl(a | i = b, law) + (1  r)l(a | i = v, law) is the physician’s expected medical liability;
and     0 measures how the physician internalizes the risk of increased antibiotic resistance.
The patient’s expected utility is determined by his health and out-of-pocket cost, if any.
An antibiotic increases the patient’s health, but only in the case of a bacterial infection. On
the other hand, an antibiotic can cause side effects or lead to an adverse drug reaction, and it
may imply an out-of-pocket cost for the patient. Therefore, I assume that the patient prefers
to receive an antibiotic if he has a bacterial infection, u(1 | i = b) > u(0 | i = b), and
he prefers not to receive one otherwise, u(1 | i = v) < u(0 | i = v).22 Given these two
assumptions, there exists a unique and interior value of r, which is denoted by rpat, such that
U(0, rpat) = U(1, rpat). If the patient could prescribe an antibiotic to himself, he would do so if
and only if r   rpat.
The physician’s expected liability is essentially the probability that a malpractice claim
against her is brought forward times the monetary and nonmonetary costs that are asso-
ciated with a claim, where the tort law potentially affects both the incentives for patients
to sue the physician and the costs to the physician that result from a claim. In our setup,
the physician can be held liable for medical malpractice for failing to prescribe an antibiotic
and for provoking an adverse drug reaction. When the patient suffers from a viral infection,
prescribing an antibiotic gives rise to greater expected liability than not prescribing an an-
tibiotic, l(1 | i = v, law) > l(0 | i = v, law). This is because the physician cannot be held
responsible for failing to prescribe an antibiotic to a patient with viral infection but she can
potentially be held responsible for an adverse drug reaction. On the other hand, not giving
an antibiotic to a patient with a bacterial infection can result in the patient being severely
harmed and is most likely to result in a medical malpractice claim in our setup, consider-
22Both assumptions can be relaxed, to some extent, without affecting the results that follow in the next
sections. Thus, the model can also accommodate patients with a bias towards (or against, for that matter)
antibiotics.
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ing that adverse drug reactions from antibiotics are relatively rare.23 Therefore, prescribing
an antibiotic minimizes expected liability when the patient suffers from a bacterial infection,
l(1 | i = b, law) < l(0 | i = b, law). It follows that there exists a unique and interior value of
r, which is denoted by rlaw, such that L(0, rlaw | law) = L(1, rlaw | law). Furthermore, we have
that L(1, r | law)   L(0, r | law) if and only if r  rlaw.
In essence, the liability system is aligned with the patient’s preferences: it is optimal to pre-
scribe (not to prescribe) an antibiotic to a patient with a high (low) risk of bacterial infection
from both a legal and patient point of view. However, the liability system must not perfectly
mirror the patient’s preferences.24 For example, if rlaw < rpat, then the liability system exhibits
a bias towards prescribing more antibiotics relative to what is optimal for the patient. In what
follows, we will see that such a legal bias affects both the physician’s decision to prescribe an
antibiotic and the effect that tort reforms have on the physician’s prescribing behavior.
2.3.1 The Physician’s Prescription Decision
The physician prescribes an antibiotic if and only if V (1, r | law)   V (0, r | law). She does
does not prescribe an antibiotic to a patient who is certain to have a viral infection, given that
V (1, 0 | law) < V (0, 0 | law). If   is sufficiently small, then V (1, 1 | law) > V (0, 1 | law),
which implies that the physician prescribes an antibiotic to a patient who is certain to have a
bacterial infection. As V (·) has strictly increasing differences in (a, r), the physician’s optimal
decision rule is a cut-off strategy: a(r) = 1 if r   rphy(law) and a(r) = 0 if r < rphy(law). The
cut-off, which is denoted by rphy(law), is interior, depends on the tort law, and is determined
by the following equation:
4U (rphy(law))    = 4L (rphy(law) | law) , (2.1)
where 4U(r) ⌘ U(1, r)  U(0, r) and 4L(r | law) ⌘ L(1, r | law)  L(0, r | law).
For the marginal patient, the incremental expected utility from receiving an antibiotic
minus the cost the physician attributes to the risk of increased antibiotic resistance is equal to
the increment in expected liability due to the antibiotic prescription. The physician’s optimal
choice is depicted in Figure 2.1, where rphy(0) is the cut-off the physician would choose in the
absence of a liability system. The physician’s cut-off as a function of the law is characterized
as follows.
Proposition 3. rphy (law) is unique and satisfiesmin{rphy(0), rlaw}  rphy (law)  max{rphy(0), rlaw},
where the inequalities are strict if rphy(0) 6= rlaw.
23Less than two percent of the patients in a sample of Medicare enrollees taking antibiotics in the ambulatory
care setting experienced an adverse drug reaction (Gurwitz et al. 2003).
24In this regard, the model departs from Shurtz (2014) and other studies in the literature that assume a perfect
liability system.
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Figure 2.1: The physician’s prescription decision
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Notes: Figure depicts the physician’s prescription decision for two different legal regimes. If the
patient could decide for himself, he would choose to receive an antibiotic whenever r   rpat.
If there was no liability system, the physician would prescribe an antibiotic whenever r  
rphy(0). Under the purple legal regime, lawA, the physician prescribes an antibiotic whenever
r   rphy(lawA). Under the orange legal regime, lawB, the physician prescribes an antibiotic
whenever r   rphy(lawB).
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Proof: Define 4V (r | law) ⌘ V (1, r | law)   V (0, r | law) and note that 4V (· | law) is
strictly increasing and rphy(law) solves 4V (r | law) = 0. This implies that rphy(law) is unique.
Suppose that rphy(0) < rlaw. Note that 4V (rphy(0) | law) =  4L(rphy(0) | law) < 0 since
4L(· | law) is strictly decreasing and rphy(0) < rlaw. Since 4V (· | law) is strictly increasing, it
must be that rphy(law) > rphy(0). Moreover, we have that 4V (rlaw | law) = 4U(rlaw)     > 0
since 4U(·) is strictly increasing and rlaw > rphy(0). It follows that rphy(0) < rphy(law) < rlaw.
The other two cases follow analogously. Q.E.D.
The physician’s cut-off will generally differ from the patient’s preferred cut-off because the
physician balances her concern for the patient’s utility against the legal implications of the
prescription decision and the risk of increased antibiotic resistance. If the tort law introduces
a bias against prescribing antibiotics relative to what is optimal for the patient, such as lawB
in Figure 2.1, then the physician will prescribe fewer antibiotics than the patient desires. On
the other hand, the physician may also prescribe more antibiotics than what is optimal for the
patient. This happens when the tort law exhibits a sufficiently large bias towards prescribing
antibiotics, such as lawA in Figure 2.1.
2.3.2 Tort Reforms and Antibiotic Prescriptions
Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (2.1) yields the effect of a marginal change
in the tort law on the cut-off that the physician applies to prescribe an antibiotic:
drphy (law)
dlaw
=
4Llaw (rphy (law) | law)
4Ur (rphy (law)) 4Lr (rphy (law) | law) . (2.2)
The denominator is positive, so that the sign of the tort reform’s effect on rphy(law) is the
same as the sign of the numerator in equation (2.2). In order to proceed, it is necessary to
take a stance on the effect of tort reforms on the liability pressure that physicians experience.
I make the following assumption in this regard.
Assumption 2. Tort reforms have a proportional impact on the liability pressure that physicians
experience: Llaw(a, r | law) = µL(a, r | law) for all a, r, and law.
In other words, tort reforms have a greater effect on the liability pressure resulting from
high-risk patients and medication treatments than on the pressure resulting from low-risk pa-
tients and medication treatments. As such, tort reforms that increase the liability pressure on
physicians (µ > 0) disproportionately increase the liability pressure that physicians experi-
ence while treating high-risk patients and performing high-risk medication treatments. Tort
reforms that satisfy Assumption 2 have the appealing feature that they do not change the
cut-off rlaw, which determines when, in expectation, it is preferred from a legal perspective to
prescribe an antibiotic and when not. In practice, tort reforms are not enacted to increase or
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decrease the use of a specific medical procedure. Any theory that would predict a change in
the cut-off rlaw after a reform would therefore be hard to rationalize. Besides that, Assumption
2 is also compatible with several functional forms for the liability function that are commonly
adopted in the medical malpractice literature.25
We are now in a position to characterize the effect of tort reforms on antibiotic prescrip-
tions.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. A liability-reducing tort reform, such as a cap
on noneconomic damages, causes physicians to prescribe fewer (more) antibiotics if and only if
rlaw < (>) rphy(0).
Proof: Assumption 2 implies that 4Llaw(r | law) = µ4L(r | law) for all r and law. Substi-
tuting into equation (2.2), we obtain sign{drphy(law)/dlaw} = sign{µ4L(rphy(law) | law)},
which boils down to sign{drphy(law)/dlaw} = sign{ 4L(rphy(law) | law)} in the case of a
liability-reducing tort reform. Proposition 3 shows that rphy(law) > (<) rlaw if and only if
rlaw < (>) rphy(0). Recalling that 4L(· | law) is strictly decreasing and 4L(rlaw | law) = 0, it
follows that drphy(law)/dlaw > (<) 0 in the case of a liability-reducing tort reform if and only
if rlaw < (>) rphy(0). Q.E.D.
Figure 2.2 illustrates Proposition 4. We see that a tort reform that puts less liability pres-
sure on physicians can increase or decrease the number of antibiotic prescriptions. The effect
of the reform depends on whether the liability system introduces a bias towards or against
prescribing antibiotics relative to what the physician would choose in the absence of a liability
system. If the liability system introduces a bias towards prescribing more antibiotics, such as
lawA, then a reduction in liability pressure will lead physicians to prescribe fewer antibiotics.
Conversely, if the liability system introduces a bias against prescribing antibiotics, such as
lawB, then a reduction in liability pressure implies more antibiotic prescriptions.
2.3.3 The Social Optimum and Defensive Medicine
The social planner trades off the patient’s benefit against the social cost of increased antibiotic
resistance. He chooses a to maximize W (a, r) = U(a, r)    ⇤a, where the social cost of
increased antibiotic resistance,  ⇤, is potentially different from the cost that the physician
takes into account,  . Not surprisingly, the social optimum is also characterized by a cut-off,
which is denoted by r⇤, so that it is socially optimal to prescribe an antibiotic if and only if
r   r⇤. Given that  ⇤ is sufficiently small, this cut-off is interior and uniquely determined by
4U (r⇤)   ⇤ = 0. (2.3)
25One example that satisfies Assumption 2 is the liability function proposed by Shurtz (2014), according to
which the tort law affects only the cost to the physician that results from a malpractice claim and not the patient’s
propensity to sue the physician.
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Figure 2.2: The effect of a liability-reducing tort reform on prescriptions
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Notes: Figure depicts the effect of a liability-reducing tort reform on antibiotic prescriptions for
two different legal regimes, lawA and lawB, where the former is more in favor of antibiotics
than the latter. Tort reforms that satisfy Assumption 2 correspond to a rotation of the function
4L(· | law) around the cut-off rlaw. Under the purple legal regime, lawA, a reduction in liability
pressure leads to a decrease in antibiotic prescriptions given that rlawA < rphy(0). As rlawB >
rphy(0), a reduction in liability pressure causes an increase in antibiotic prescriptions under the
orange legal regime, lawB.
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Defensive medicine is defined with respect to the socially optimal level of care: medical
care for which the expected social cost exceeds the expected social benefit is considered de-
fensive if it is delivered to avoid potential litigation. In our setup, the expected social cost of
an antibiotic exceeds its expected social benefit whenever r < r⇤. Now if rphy(law) < r⇤, then
the physician will prescribe some socially wasteful antibiotics. However, only in the case in
which rphy(law) < rphy(0) does the physician prescribe antibiotics to protect herself against the
risk of malpractice, for if rphy(law) > rphy(0) then the tort law actually induces the physician
to prescribe fewer antibiotics. Therefore, we can say that the physician prescribes antibiotics
defensively if and only if rphy(law) < rphy(0) and rphy(law) < r⇤.
How do we know whether these two inequalities are satisfied in practice? From Proposi-
tions 3 and 4, we can deduce that the first inequality holds if a liability-reducing tort reform
leads physicians to prescribe fewer antibiotics. But without further assumptions, the model
is silent about the second inequality. In order to arrive at a test of defensive medicine, I
introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 3. The physician internalizes weakly less of the risk of increased antibiotic resistance
than the social planner:     ⇤.
In surveys, physicians report that they believe that their prescribing behavior does not sig-
nificantly affect antibiotic resistance (Kumar et al. 2003), that antibiotic resistance carries the
least weight in their prescription decision (Metlay et al. 2002), and that antibiotic resistance
is a community issue and less important than the well being of the individual patient (Butler
et al. 1998). In light of these self-reports, it seems reasonable to assume that physicians do
not fully internalize the cost of increased antibiotic resistance.
Assumption 3 implies that physicians tend to prescribe more antibiotics than socially
optimal if there is no liability system in place: rphy(0)  r⇤.26 Given this, we know that
rphy(law) < rphy(0) is a necessary and sufficient conditions for the two inequalities that deter-
mine whether antibiotics are prescribed defensively to be satisfied. The following corollary,
which represents the central result of the theoretical analysis, summarizes how we can use
tort reforms to test for defensive medicine.
Corollary 2. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Antibiotics are prescribed defensively if
and only if a liability-reducing tort reform, such as a cap on noneconomic damages, causes a
decrease in antibiotic prescriptions.
26Apart from not internalizing the risk of increased antibiotic resistance, there may be other reasons why
physicians prescribe more antibiotics than socially optimal. Physicians tend not to internalize the part of the
drug cost that health insurance companies have to bear (Lundin 2000, Iizuka 2007). Physicians may also hope
to attract new patients or retain current ones by prescribing antibiotics (Bennett et al. 2015). Finally, physicians
may also prescribe antibiotics because they are receptive to marketing efforts by pharmaceutical companies. On
the other hand, there seems to be only one factor that explains why physicians would prescribe fewer antibiotics
than socially optimal, which is that they do not consider the positive effect that curing one patient’s bacterial
infection has on the patient’s social network. It seems unlikely that this factor alone could tilt the balance
towards physicians prescribing fewer antibiotics than socially optimal in the absence of a liability system.
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In the empirical analysis, I will exploit noneconomic damages cap reforms to obtain causal
estimates of the effect of a reduction in liability pressure on antibiotic prescriptions and use
these estimates to test for defensive medicine along the lines of Corollary 2. I will complement
this approach with a traditional test of defensive medicine à la Kessler and McClellan (1996),
in which I contrast changes in antibiotic prescriptions after noneconomic damages cap reforms
with corresponding changes in health outcomes that can potentially be improved by antibiotic
use.
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics
2.4.1 National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey
The National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey is a nationally representative survey of visits to
non-federal employed office-based physicians in the U.S., excluding anesthesiologists, pathol-
ogists, and radiologists. The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), which conducts the
survey, employs a three-stage sampling procedure. Each of the about 1,200 physicians who
participate annually in the survey is randomly assigned to a one-week reporting period, dur-
ing which data is collected for a systematic random sample of about 25 patients. Physicians
and patients may be sampled in multiple years, but it is not possible to identify longitudinal
linkages.
For each visit, the data contains the patient’s symptoms, the physician’s diagnosis ac-
cording to the ICD-9-CM, and treatments and medications ordered or provided. Antibiotic
prescriptions can be identified using the NCHS-assigned five-digit medication codes in con-
junction with the NCHS Ambulatory Care Drug Database System (see Appendix 2.A for more
details). Geographic information in the public-use NAMCS data files is limited and restricted
to identifiers indicating census region and MSA status. I obtained access to restricted-use
NAMCS data at the NCHS Research Data Center, through which it was possible to identify
the county and state in which physician practices are located. This information was used to
assign the corresponding state tort laws to physicians.
The left panel of Table 2.1 contains descriptive statistics for the key variables from the
NAMCS. The data corresponds to the survey years from 1993 to 2011 and includes a total
of 546,990 patient visits. On average, physicians prescribe about two drugs per ambulatory
care visit. Antibiotics, which are coded as a dummy variable, are prescribed in about one
in eight visits. When physicians prescribe antibiotics, they mostly prescribe broad-spectrum
antibiotics, which act against a wider range of bacteria but also imply a higher risk of increased
antibiotic resistance than narrow-spectrum antibiotics.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of key variables
NAMCS NIS
Mean SE N Mean SE N
Prescription outcomes
Any kind of antibiotic 0.1271 (0.0015) 543,125
Broad-spectrum antibiotic 0.0902 (0.0012) 543,018
Narrow-spectrum antibiotic 0.0367 (0.0006) 543,018
Number of drugs 1.8583 (0.0224) 543,125
Health outcomes
Peritonsillar abscess 0.0004 (0.0000) 141,417,785
Rheumatic fever 0.0000 (0.0000) 141,417,785
Mastoiditis 0.0001 (0.0000) 141,417,785
Septicemia 0.0134 (0.0002) 141,417,785
Pneumonia 0.0315 (0.0002) 141,417,785
Meningitis 0.0003 (0.0000) 141,417,785
Patient
Female 0.5908 (0.0016) 546,990 0.5869 (0.0009) 141,278,661
Age 44.1265 (0.1849) 546,990 47.2901 (0.1785) 141,392,820
White 0.7546 (0.0095) 513,882 0.6887 (0.0056) 110,044,140
Black 0.0947 (0.0037) 513,882 0.1421 (0.0038) 110,044,140
Latino 0.1085 (0.0081) 513,882 0.1137 (0.0040) 110,044,140
Insurance
Private 0.5612 (0.0056) 529,019 0.3621 (0.0032) 141,052,576
Medicare 0.2219 (0.0033) 529,019 0.3664 (0.0026) 141,052,576
Medicaid 0.1119 (0.0037) 529,019 0.1855 (0.0027) 141,052,576
Notes: Standard errors accounting for complex survey design in parentheses.
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2.4.2 Nationwide Inpatient Sample
The Nationwide Inpatient Sample is part of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP),
which is sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Covering about seven
million hospital stays each year, the NIS constitutes the largest publicly available all-payer
inpatient healthcare database in the U.S. The data is collected annually from about 1,000
hospitals, which are sampled to approximate a 20-percent stratified sample of U.S. commu-
nity hospitals, where each hospital reports on all discharges that occur throughout the year.
The NIS records include ICD-9-CM codes for the diagnoses and procedures that patients re-
ceive, as well as patient and hospital characteristics. Until 2011, the NIS data also includes
identifiers for the county and state in which hospitals are located, which were used to assign
hospitals the corresponding state tort laws. Not all states participate in the HCUP, but the
number of states that do has grown over time (from 8 in 1988 to 17 in 1993 to 46 in 2011).
The right panel of Table 2.1 contains descriptive statistics for the key variables from the
NIS. The data corresponds to the survey years from 1993 to 2011 and includes a total of
142,002,152 inpatient stays. The six health outcomes that are listed in the table represent
complications that can potentially be prevented by antibiotic use in primary care. Each com-
plication is captured by a dummy variable that equals one if the primary diagnosis corresponds
to the complication.27 Some of these complications, such as rheumatic fever, represent only a
tiny fraction of all inpatient stays. Septicemia and pneumonia, however, together account for
almost five percent of all inpatient stays during the sample period, corresponding to almost
7 million observations. Patient demographics are similar between the NAMCS and NIS data,
but the fraction of privately insured patients is lower in the NIS data.
2.4.3 State Tort Laws
I collected information about the state tort laws from various sources and merged it onto
the NAMCS and NIS data. I built on Ronen Avraham’s Database of State Tort Law Reforms
(Avraham 2014) and the state law data provided in an appendix to Currie and MacLeod
(2008) and supplemented these two sources with information from the American Tort Reform
Association and the state codes. The final product is a dataset covering the four reforms
discussed earlier – caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages, modifications
of the collateral-source rule, and modifications of the joint-and-several liability rule – and the
years from 1992 to 2012 on a monthly basis, where the years 1992 and 2012 are covered to
allow for the inclusion of reform lags and leads of up to one year. Following Frakes (2012),
I say that noneconomic damages are capped if a state caps the total amount of damages that
27The corresponding ICD-9-CM codes are 475 for peritonsillar abscess, 390-392 for rheumatic fever, 383
for mastoiditis, 038 for septicemia, 481-486 for pneumonia (bacterial or unspecified), and 320 and 322 for
meningitis (bacterial or unspecified).
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Table 2.2: Noneconomic damages cap reforms, 1993-2011
Cap enacted Cap repealed
IL 03/09/1995 $500,000+ IL 12/18/1997 $500,000+
ND 08/01/1995 $500,000* OH 02/25/1998 $1,000,000
MT 10/01/1995 $250,000* OR 07/15/1999 $500,000
OH 01/27/1997 $1,000,000 WI 07/14/2005 $350,000*+
NV 10/01/2002 $350,000* IL 02/04/2010 $500,000*
MS 01/01/2003 $500,000* GA 03/22/2010 $350,000*
OK 07/01/2003 $300,000*
TX 09/01/2003 $250,000*
GA 02/16/2005 $350,000*
SC 07/01/2005 $350,000*
IL 08/24/2005 $500,000*
WI 04/06/2006 $750,000*
NC 10/01/2011 $500,000*
TN 10/01/2011 $1,000,000
Notes: * indicates that the cap applies only to medical malpractice rather than
to all torts. + indicates that the cap is adjusted for inflation on a regular basis.
can be awarded.28
Recall that the literature on the effect of tort reforms on the medical malpractice envi-
ronment says that caps on noneconomic damages are the only policy that have a clear-cut
impact on liability pressure. For this reason, I focus on noneconomic damages caps to identify
the effect of liability pressure on prescription and health outcomes. Table 2.2 lists the 20
noneconomic damage cap reforms that have taken place over the sample period. In total, 14
different states enacted tort reforms between 1993 and 2011.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy is based on the assumption that states that adopt noneconomic dam-
ages caps would, if they had not adopted a cap, experience the same trends in prescription
and health outcomes as states that do not adopt noneconomic damages caps. This assump-
tion leads to the following difference-in-differences specification, which can be consistently
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS),
Yist = ↵ +  CAPst +  Xist +  Zst + ✓t +  s + "ist. (2.4)
28This rule applies to four states (Indiana, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Virginia), all of which enact the total
damages cap before the beginning of the sample period and do not experience a change in the noneconomic
damages cap indicator during the sample period.
63
The subscripts i, s, and t stand for, respectively, a visit, a state, and a year-month combination.
Yist represents a prescription or health outcome. CAPst indicates whether state s imposes a cap
on noneconomic damages in period t. Xist is a vector of controls and includes dummies for
patient age (<5, 5-17, 18-44, 45-64, 65-79, 80+), patient gender, patient race and ethnicity
(white, black, latino, other), patient health insurance (private, Medicare, Medicaid, other),
physician degree (MD, DO), physician specialty (14 categories), physician age (<35, 35-
54, 55+), physician gender, and practice/hospital location (MSA, non-MSA).29 Zst controls
for the presence of caps on punitive damages, modifications of the collateral-source rule,
and modifications of the joint-and-several liability rule. ✓t and  s are year-month and state
dummies, respectively, and "ist is the error term. Throughout the analysis, I use the sampling
weights that are provided by the NAMCS. As is customary in the estimation of difference-in-
differences models with policies that vary at the state level, I report standard errors that are
clustered at the state level (Bertrand et al. 2004).
I focus on the following prescription outcomes: the prescription of any kind of antibiotic,
the prescription of narrow- or broad-spectrum antibiotics, the total number of medications
prescribed (which is topcoded at 5 in 1993/1994, at 6 from 1995 to 2002, and at 8 from
2003 onwards), and the prescription of antibiotic substitutes. Following Little et al. (2002)
and other studies in the medical literature, I consider the following six health conditions
that can potentially be avoided through antibiotic use in primary care: peritonsillar abscess
(quinsy), rheumatic fever, mastoiditis, septicemia, pneumonia, and meningitis. If noneco-
nomic damages caps influence the physicians’ prescribing behavior but do not affect any of
the related health outcomes, this would be evidence of defensive medicine.
To study which doctors and patients are particularly affected by noneconomic damages
caps, I estimate models that include interaction terms between the cap indicator and vari-
ables such as the patient’s type of health insurance and the physician’s association to an
HMO, which have previously been identified as sources of heterogeneity in the malpractice
literature. Finally, I conduct a variety of tests to assess the validity of the results, including
tests that support the notion that noneconomic damages cap reforms are exogenous and not
driven by preexisting trends in the outcome variables.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Prescription Outcomes
Table 2.3 shows how noneconomic damages caps affect antibiotic prescriptions and the total
number of drugs prescribed. The introduction of a noneconomic damages cap implies that
doctors are 0.8 percentage points less likely to prescribe an antibiotic, which translates into
29The controls for physician characteristics are included only in prescription outcome regressions as this kind
of information is not available in the NIS data.
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Table 2.3: Impact of noneconomic damages caps on antibiotic and all prescriptions
Any antibiotic Broad-spectrum antibiotic Narrow-spectrum antibiotic Number of drugs
CAP -6.30*** -4.77 -10.63*** -0.02
(2.05) (2.99) (3.82) (3.35)
R2 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.23
N 479,009 478,914 478,914 479,009
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (2.4). The coefficients on the cap on
noneconomic damages and the corresponding standard errors, which are shown in parentheses, are
divided by the mean of the dependent variable and multiplied by 100. Standard errors are adjusted
for clustering at the state level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
a reduction of 6.3 percent over baseline. This effect is statistically and economically signif-
icant. Using the NAMCS survey weights to extrapolate the effect to the U.S. population as
a whole, I estimate that, in the year 2011 alone, there would have been about 3.2 million
fewer ambulatory care visits that culminate in the prescription of antibiotics if all states had
adopted a cap on noneconomic damages (29 states had an active cap at the end of 2011). To
put this number into perspective, in total, doctors prescribe antibiotics in about 120 million
ambulatory care visits per year. Hence, through the introduction of noneconomic damages
caps, one could achieve a reduction of ambulatory care visits with antibiotic prescriptions of
almost 3 percent.
Comparing the second and third column of Table 2.3, we see that narrow-spectrum antibi-
otics are statistically significantly affected by the introduction of noneconomic damages caps,
whereas broad-spectrum antibiotics are not affected. It appears that physicians do not value
the additional legal protection that broad-spectrum antibiotics can offer in certain cases, or
that other factors – such as the higher cost of broad-spectrum antibiotics, the higher risk of
side effects, and the bigger impact on antibiotic resistance that broad-spectrum antibiotics
have compared to narrow-spectrum antibiotics – outweigh the benefits of broad-spectrum
antibiotics for the marginal patient.
From Column 4 of Table 2.3, we can infer that physicians do not adjust the number of
drugs they prescribe in response to noneconomic damages cap reforms. This suggests that
doctors substitute other drugs for antibiotics when they face less liability pressure. To deter-
mine which medications doctors substitute for antibiotics, I turn to the drugs that are most
frequently prescribed together with antibiotics or for conditions for which antibiotics are com-
monly prescribed. These are antiinflammatory drugs, such as Tylenol, Advil, and Aspirin, an-
tihistamines, antitussives, decongestants, expectorants, and upper respiratory combinations
(URC). Table 2.4 shows that, out of these drugs, only antitussives (a form of cough medica-
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Table 2.4: Impact of noneconomic damages caps on antibiotic substitutes
Tylenol Advil Aspirin Antihistamines Antitussives Decongestants Expectorants URC
CAP -6.03 0.79 -9.60 9.74 47.33* -19.55 24.11 -25.39
(15.08) (13.51) (18.19) (9.26) (25.63) (17.77) (15.50) (18.56)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 479,009
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (2.4). The coefficients on the cap on noneconomic
damages and the corresponding standard errors, which are shown in parentheses, are divided by the mean of
the dependent variable and multiplied by 100. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
tion that is marketed, inter alia, under the brand name Codeine) are statistically significantly
affected by the introduction of noneconomic damages caps. As doctors prescribe more anti-
tussives after the introduction of noneconomic damages caps, it appears that antitussives act
as a substitute for antibiotics. From a medical standpoint, this is actually a desirable substi-
tution, given that antitussives represent a more effective treatment option than antibiotics for
many cases of upper respiratory tract infections (Zanasi et al. 2016).
Table 2.5 shows that noneconomic damages caps do not affect all patients equally. Pa-
tients aged 80 and above, for example, are not less likely to be prescribed an antibiotic after
the introduction of a noneconomic damages cap, which can be explained by the fact that
older patients pose less of a malpractice risk to physicians because of lower future earnings
losses and fewer years of pain and suffering. This result is also reflected in the estimates
shown in the second panel of Table 2.5, which reveal that physicians do not adjust antibi-
otic prescriptions in response to noneconomic damages caps for Medicare patients, who are
predominantly aged 65 years and above. The second panel moreover illustrates that physi-
cians react more strongly to caps when the patient’s health insurance belongs to the category
“other”, which includes self-pay, worker’s compensation, and no charge. One explanation for
this finding is that many physicians (falsely) believe that low-income patients, who often have
no health insurance coverage, are more likely to sue for medical malpractice than other pa-
tients (McClellan et al. 2012). The third panel of Table 2.5 shows that physicians who work in
HMO-owned practices do not react differently to noneconomic damages caps than their peers
who work in practices that are not owned by HMOs, at least not in statistical terms. However,
this finding should not be viewed as conclusive evidence given that there are only few obser-
vations of physicians practicing in HMOs and given that the variable that indicates whether a
practice is owned by an HMO is not available in all survey years. Finally, there is no statistical
evidence suggesting that older physicians react differently to caps on noneconomic damages
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Table 2.5: Impact of noneconomic damages caps on subgroups
Patient age Health insurance HMO
CAP⇥0-4 -11.41 CAP⇥private -6.38*** CAP -7.08**
(9.92) (2.28) (2.68)
CAP⇥5-17 -2.28 CAP⇥Medicare -0.47 CAP⇥HMO -9.52
(5.98) (3.62) (8.58)
CAP⇥18-44 -10.78*** CAP⇥Medicaid -7.87
(2.44) (5.67)
CAP⇥45-64 -7.16** CAP⇥other -16.21***
(3.46) (2.52)
CAP⇥65-79 -3.38
(3.70)
CAP⇥80+ 7.56
(4.88)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.06
N 479,009 479,009 356,947
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (2.4) augmented for
interaction terms. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating any antibiotic
prescription. Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are divided by
the mean of the dependent variable and multiplied by 100. Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the state level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure 2.3: Preprogram regressions
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Notes: Figure reports results from OLS estimation of equation (2.4), where the dependent
variable is a dummy indicating any antibiotic prescription and the regression model in-
cludes dummies that equal one in from one to six months before a noneconomic damages
cap is enacted. Standard errors corresponding to the confidence intervals are adjusted for
clustering at the state level. Point estimates and confidence intervals are expressed as a
percentage of the mean antibiotic prescription rate.
than younger physicians, or that primary care physicians react differently than specialists, or
that general practitioners and pediatricians behave differently from the rest of their peers.
2.6.2 Threads to Validity
The main identifying assumption behind every difference-in-differences setup is that the treat-
ment and control group would experience parallel trends if both were left untreated. Legisla-
tive endogeneity – the possibility that preexisting trends in the medical care sector cause
tort reforms – poses a threat to the parallel trends assumption. Figure 2.3 and Table 2.6
present four pieces of evidence suggesting that noneconomic damages cap reforms are caus-
ing a change in antibiotic prescriptions and not vice versa. Figure 2.3 contains the results
of so-called preprogram regressions (Heckman and Hotz 1989), which reveal that states that
adopt noneconomic damages caps have statistically similar antibiotic prescription rates in the
six months leading up to the reforms as states that do not adopt caps. Column 1 of Table 2.6
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Table 2.6: Further tests for legislative endogeneity
Only caps Only caps nonspecific State-specific
turning off to medical malpractice time trends
CAP 5.67*** -3.15 -6.61
(1.73) (5.82) (5.12)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07
N 479,009 479,009 479,009
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (2.4),
where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating any antibiotic
prescription. Column 1 reports the coefficient on a dummy that
equals one as long as a noneconomic damages cap has been turned
off. Column 2 reports the coefficient on an indicator for caps on
noneconomic damages that are not specific to medical malprac-
tice. Column 3 reports the coefficient on the noneconomic dam-
ages cap indicator from a model that includes state-specific linear
and quadratic time trends. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the state level in parentheses. All coefficients and standard errors
are divided by the mean of the dependent variable and multiplied
by 100. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
illustrates that when noneconomic damages caps are turned off, which arguably resembles
a truly exogenous change in liability pressure given that caps are turned off almost exclu-
sively because they are ruled unconstitutional, we also find a statistically significant effect on
antibiotic prescriptions (positive in this case, because liability pressure increases). Column
2 of 2.6 shows that noneconomic damages caps that are not specific to medical malpractice
have a similar impact on antibiotic prescriptions as caps that are specific to malpractice.30
Finally, Column 3 of 2.6 shows that the inclusion of state-specific time trends, while leading
to a sharp increase in the standard errors of the estimates, does not quantitatively affect how
noneconomic damages caps influence antibiotic prescriptions.
Apart from nonparallel trends, one may also be worried about fitting a linear model to
binary dependent variables. Fortunately, Table 2.7 shows that a Probit model yields similar
results as the linear probability model. Table 2.7 moreover shows that the use of sampling
weights is not driving the results and that excluding observations for which one or more of
the covariates are imputed does not affect the results either.
A final issue concerns the choice of covariates in equation (2.4). To mitigate potential
concerns about bad controls (see, for example, Angrist and Pischke 2008), I have estimated
30Note that only five out of 20 noneconomic damages caps reforms are not specific to medical malpractice,
which contributes to the coefficient on the cap being no longer statistically significant.
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Table 2.7: Sensitivity Analysis
excluding no controls no controls only visit- only state-
Probit no weights imputed full sample restricted sample level controls level controls
CAP -5.82*** -5.30* -6.30** -1.26 -7.24* -5.90** -3.38
(2.05) (2.65) (2.44) (2.52) (3.96) (2.36) (2.52)
R2 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.01
N 479,009 479,009 378,160 543,125 127,202 479,009 543,125
Notes: Table reports results from estimation of equation (2.4). Column 1 reports the average marginal effect
of the cap indicator from a Probit model. Column 2 reports the results from an OLS model that does not use
survey weights. Column 3 reports the results from an OLS model that excludes observations with imputed
values. Columns 4 and 5 report the results from an OLS model excluding the controls X and Z. Column
4 reports the results for the whole sample, and Column 5 reports the result for the sample of patients who
visit the physician with symptoms of respiratory conditions. Columns 6 and 7, respectively, report results from
OLS models that exclude the controls X and Z. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the state level
in parentheses. All coefficients and standard errors are divided by the mean of the dependent variable and
multiplied by 100. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
the baseline model with different sets of controls (see Table 2.7) and included the covariates
one by one as dependent variables in what I call bad control tests (see Table 2.12 in Appendix
2.B). Not controlling for visit-level controls such as the patient’s age and race leads to a large
drop in the R-squared of the regression model, resulting in insignificant coefficients on the
cap on noneconomic damages. But, restricting the sample to patients who visit the physician
with symptoms related to respiratory conditions, who arguably are the main driver behind the
effect of noneconomic damages caps on antibiotic prescriptions, restores significance of the
coefficient on the cap on noneconomic damages. The bad control tests in Table 2.12 reveal no
change in patient and physician characteristics after noneconomic damages cap reforms, with
one exception: Ambulatory care physicians seem to take up more privately insured patients
and fewer Medicare patients, who are older on average. If these privately insured patients
are the riskier cases that doctors were unwilling to take up without caps on damages, then we
might expect this change in the patient population to have a positive impact on the antibiotic
prescription rate. This would mean that my results are conservative estimates of the true
effect of noneconomic damages caps on antibiotic prescriptions.
2.6.3 Health Outcomes
All in all, the results presented so far suggest that physicians prescribe more antibiotics in
response to liability pressure. What we do not know is whether these antibiotics are socially
wasteful or not. If the assumptions of the theoretical model hold, then we should believe that
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Table 2.8: Impact of noneconomic damages caps on health outcomes (I)
Peritonsillar abscess Rheumatic fever Mastoiditis Septicemia Pneumonia Meningitis
CAP 7.57 -8.33 26.02** 3.84 3.37 -11.46***
(6.98) (9.79) (9.94) (5.16) (3.45) (3.58)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
N 98,275,213
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (2.4). The coefficients on the cap on
noneconomic damages and the corresponding standard errors, which are shown in parentheses, are
divided by the mean of the dependent variable and multiplied by 100. Standard errors are adjusted
for clustering at the state level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
they are: the model predicts that antibiotics are prescribed defensively if a liability-reducing
tort reform, such as a cap on noneconomic damages, causes a decrease in antibiotic prescrip-
tions. To provide further evidence on this matter, we will now turn to a test of defensive
medicine à la Kessler and McClellan (1996), for which we contrast the changes in antibiotic
prescriptions with changes in health conditions that can potentially be prevented by the timely
use of antibiotics.
Table 2.8 reveals the contemporaneous impact that noneconomic damages caps have
on health outcomes related to antibiotic use. As we can see from the table, noneconomic
damages caps are not causing an increase in hospital discharges for peritonsillar abscess,
rheumatic fever, septicemia, pneumonia, and meningitis, even though doctors prescribe fewer
antibiotic when states adopt caps. We do, however, observe a statistically significant increase
in hospital discharges for mastoiditis after a noneconomic damages cap is enacted. While the
effect size is small in absolute terms (0.0013 percentage points), it represents a 26-percent
increase over the baseline estimate of 35,107 hospital discharges for mastoiditis that occur in
the U.S. in the period from 1993 to 2011.
Given that some complications of conditions that can be treated with antibiotics in primary
care may only manifest after a period of several weeks, it is important to look not only at
the contemporaneous impact of noneconomic damages caps but also at their impact over
time. Table 2.9 shows how caps on noneconomic damages affect health outcomes related to
antibiotic use over time. While some of the coefficients are statistically significant, there is
no clear pattern that would allow us to conclude that the fewer antibiotic prescriptions after
noneconomic damages cap reforms translate into more hospitalizations.31
In sum, the health outcome results support the notion that marginal antibiotics are used
31Note that Table 2.9 tests multiple hypotheses. Just by chance, some of the coefficients therefore have to be
statistically significant.
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Table 2.9: Impact of noneconomic damages caps on health outcomes (II)
Peritonsillar abscess Rheumatic fever Mastoiditis Septicemia Pneumonia Meningitis
CAPt -31.95** 5.98 8.04 0.04 -1.94 -16.46*
(14.40) (34.73) (46.80) (3.99) (2.82) (8.49)
CAPt 1 10.51 -15.51 23.03 3.73 3.80* -11.85
(17.12) (41.82) (37.07) (2.34) (2.04) (10.72)
CAPt 2 18.41 -9.76 -43.20* -1.59 4.50 18.59
(15.35) (47.86) (24.45) (3.53) (3.01) (13.49)
CAPt 3 13.84 10.86 40.19** 1.88 -2.83 -0.91
(12.54) (18.63) (17.55) (5.18) 2.05 (12.36)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
N 98,275,213
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (2.4), where three months of lags of the cap
indicator also enter into the regression model. The coefficients on the cap on noneconomic damages and the
corresponding standard errors, which are shown in parentheses, are divided by the mean of the dependent
variable and multiplied by 100. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
for defensive reasons and have little or no health benefits. Even though there is a statistically
significant increase in the number of discharges with the primary diagnosis mastoiditis, the
cost of these additional discharges is likely to be inferior to the cost savings through a reduc-
tion in antibiotic prescriptions.32 The empirical findings thus confirm the prediction of the
theoretical model that liability-induced antibiotics are socially wasteful when the amount of
antibiotic prescriptions decreases after the introduction of noneconomic damages caps.
2.7 Conclusion
By holding healthcare professionals accountable, the medical malpractice system is supposed
to improve patient outcomes and deter healthcare providers from providing too little care.
An unintended consequence of the malpractice system is that it can induce healthcare profes-
sionals to provide too much care, a phenomenon known as defensive medicine.
This paper shows that antibiotics are used as defensive medicine. Noneconomic damages
cap reforms affect the likelihood with which doctors prescribe antibiotics but do not affect
hospital stays for conditions that can be prevented through the timely use of antibiotics, with
the possible exception of mastoiditis. A theoretical model complements the empirical analysis
and predicts likewise that antibiotics are used defensively. Considering the large burden of
32Take into consideration that there are only about 2,000 mastoiditis hospitalizations per year but almost 120
million ambulatory care visits in which doctors prescribe antibiotics.
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antibiotic resistance, policymakers may contemplate adopting liability-reducing tort reforms
to decrease the inappropriate use of antibiotics. The results from this paper suggest that if all
states adopted a cap on noneconomic damages, this would reduce the number of ambulatory
care visits that result in the patient receiving a prescription for antibiotics by approximately
3.2 million.
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Appendices
2.A Classification of Drugs
The NAMCS questionnaire asks physicians to record information on up to eight drugs (five
drugs in 1993 and 1994, six drugs from 1995 to 2002). The recorded verbatim responses are
assigned a unique five-digit code according to a classification scheme developed by the NCHS.
I have classified drugs using the NCHS Ambulatory Care Drug Database System,33 which is
based on the Lexicon Plus classification of drugs by Cerner Multum Inc.
Table 2.10: Classification of antibiotics based on spectrum of activity
Spectrum Antibiotics
Narrow 1st- and 2nd-generation cephalosporins, aztreonames, colistines, daptomycin,
linezolides, metronidazoles, novobiocins, polymyxin, narrow-spectrum penicillins,
tetracyclines, sulfonamides, glycopeptides
Broad carbapenems, 3rd- and 4th-generation cephalosporins, macrolides, bacitracin,
chloramphenicol, rifaximin, furazolidone, aminoglycosides, pentamidines, methenamines,
fosfomycins, nitrofurantoins, quinolones, broad-spectrum penicillins, glycylcyclines
The following subcategories of anti-infective drugs are classified as antibiotics: carbapen-
ems, cephalosporins, macrolide derivatives, penicillins, quinolones, sulfonamides, tetracy-
clines, urinary anti-infectives, aminoglycosides, lincomycin derivatives, glycylcyclines, gly-
copeptide antibiotics, and miscellaneous antibiotics. Following the medical literature, in
particular Shapiro et al. (2014), I have further divided antibiotics into broad- and narrow-
spectrum antibiotics as shown in Table 2.10. For a small number of cases (117 out of 546,990
of visits), it was not possible to assign a spectrum of activity to the antibiotic that was pre-
scribed during the visit.34
33http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ahcd/ahcd_database.htm (last accessed June 3, 2016).
34The following NCHS drug entry codes could not be classified: empiric antibiotics, SBE prophylaxis, antimi-
crobial, endomycin, sulfametin, bacteriostatic, IV antibiotics, antifungal agent, antiinfective agent, antitubercu-
lar agent, tuberculin medication, ringworm medicine, antibacterial agent.
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Table 2.11: Antibiotics substitutes: Respiratory agents
# Antihistamines Antitussives Decongestants Expectorants URC
1 Claritin Hydrocodone Sudafed Robitussin Entex
2 Zyrtec Tessalon Perle Dimetapp Mucinex Allegra D
3 Allegra Codeine Neo-synephrine Humibid Phenergan+Codeine
4 Benadryl Cough syrup Decongestant Guaifenesin Tussionex
5 Phenergan Delsym Phenylephrine Cough formula Rondec-DM syrup
6 Seldane Cheratussin Mydfrin Organidin Rynatan
7 Atarax Tessalon Pseudoephedrine Duratuss G Robitussin-DM syrup
8 Loratadine Benzonatate Ayr Nasal Gel Humibid LA Robitussin A-C syrup
9 Clarinex Dextromethorphan AK Dilate Liquibid Duratuss
10 Hydroxyzine Benzonatate Nasal decongestant Tussin Claritin D
Table shows the top 10 drugs in terms of the number of prescriptions in the NAMCS data (brand-name and
generic versions accounted for separately) for five classes of respiratory agents.
Considering the drugs that are commonly prescribed together with antibiotics and the
drugs that are prescribed for conditions for which antibiotics are commonly prescribed, I
have identified the following respiratory agents as possible substitutes for antibiotics: anti-
histamines, antitussives, decongestants, expectorants, and upper respiratory combinations.
For each of these classes, I have identified the top 10 drugs in terms of the number of pre-
scriptions in the NAMCS data (shown in Table 2.11) and created indicators based on whether
one or more of the top 10 drugs was prescribed during the visit. In addition to the afore-
mentioned respiratory agents, I consider three common antiinflammatory agents – Tylenol,
Advil, and Aspirin (both brand-name and generic version of each) – as potential substitutes
for antibiotics.
2.B Bad control tests
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Table 2.12: Bad control tests
NAMCS NIS
Patient age -1.3992*** -0.5484
(0.4580) (0.3559)
Patient female 0.0012 0.0002
(0.0080) (0.0013)
Patient white -0.0079 0.0081
(0.0113) (0.0122)
Patient black 0.0078 0.0013
(0.0088) (0.0090)
Patient latino 0.0084 -0.0020
(0.0069) (0.0045)
Private insurance 0.0197** 0.0094
(0.0082) (0.0083)
Medicare -0.0125** -0.0086
(0.0058) (0.0077)
Medicaid 0.0088 -0.0003
(0.0059) (0.0053)
MD (vs. DO) 0.0018 —
(0.0065)
Primary care physician (vs. specialist) 0.0192 —
(0.0140)
Physician age -0.1694 —
(1.7600)
Physician female -0.0080 —
(0.0138)
Practice/hospital in MSA -0.0357 0.0105
(0.0276) (0.0265)
Notes: Table reports results from estimations of equation (2.4),
where each cell reports the results from a separate regression
and the control vectors X and Z do not enter into the regres-
sions. Rows indicate the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2,
respectively, report bad control tests for the covariates from the
NAMCS and NIS data. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at
the state level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
76
3 Tort Reform and the Length of Physician Office Visits
3.1 Introduction
Tort reform remains a heavily debated topic in the United States.35 Advocates of tort reform,
such as the American Tort Reform Association, argue that it improves the functioning of the
civil justice system, reduces the practice of defensive medicine,36 and helps to curb the growth
in healthcare expenditures. Opponents of tort reform, which include trial lawyer associations
and consumer groups, argue that it harms patients by denying them fair compensation for
injuries, reduces incentives for physicians to provide adequate levels of care, and leads to
modest expected savings.
This paper contributes to the debate on tort reform by providing the first direct evidence
on how tort reform affects the time that physicians spend with patients. There is a close
connection between the length of physician office visits and the medical malpractice system:
patients who feel rushed and poorly understood are more likely to file a malpractice claim
(Hickson et al. 1992), and physicians with greater exposure to malpractice claims devote, on
average, less to time their patients (Hickson et al. 1994, Levinson et al. 1997). To determine
whether physicians adjust the time spent with patients in response to tort reforms, I use
data from the National Medical Care Ambulatory Survey (NAMCS) on more than 500,000
physician office visits that took place between 1993 and 2011. Exploiting legislative variation
across states and over time in a difference-in-differences framework, I present estimates of
the causal effects of four commonly adopted tort reforms – caps on noneconomic damages,
caps on punitive damages, reforms of the joint-and-several liability rule, and reforms of the
collateral-source rule – on the length of office visits in U.S. ambulatory care.
Results suggest that doctors do not adjust the time they devote to patients in response
to caps on noneconomic and punitive damages and reforms of the joint-and-several liability
rule. Results are less clear regarding reforms of the collateral-source rule, which, according
to some specifications, reduce the length of office visits. These findings hold not only for the
average patient and physician but also for various patient and physician subgroups, such as
patients with private health insurance and physicians in high-risk specialties. Among the most
likely explanation for why physicians do not adjust the length of office visits are ethical and
financial constraints.
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. Section 3.2 provides background infor-
mation and references to the literatures on liability for medical malpractice and tort reform.
Section 3.3 describes the data and provides summary statistics of the analysis sample. Section
35Studdert et al. (2004) provide an excellent account of the U.S. medical malpractice system and the contro-
versies surrounding tort reform.
36Defensive medicine is commonly defined as care that physicians order to avoid lawsuits but for which social
cost exceeds social benefits.
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3.4 lays out the empirical strategy. Section 3.5 presents the results. Section 3.6 discusses why
physicians may not adjust the length of office visits in response to tort reforms. Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Liability for Medical Malpractice
Patients who received care in the U.S. can sue healthcare providers for medical malpractice
according to the terms set out in the tort law. Liability for medical malpractice is generally
based on the negligence standard. This means that patients, in order to get compensated, have
to establish that the care they received and suffered harm from was performed negligently and
fell below the standard of care that is expected from physicians in the community.
Lawsuits for medical malpractice are a rather common phenomenom in the U.S., at least
in comparison to other countries. Jena et al. (2011) estimate that 7.4% of all physicians are
sued in a given year, and that the lifetime risk of being sued is north of 75%. Jena et al.
(2011) also show that the proportion of physicians facing a malpractice claim varies widely
across physician specialties: more than 15% of surgeons are sued for medical malpractice in
a given year compared to 3.1% of pediatricians. Most physicians are fully insured against any
direct financial consequences from medical malpractice claims (Danzon 2000, Zeiler et al.
2007). However, there are considerable, uninsurable nonmonetary cost associated with being
sued for medical malpractice, which include the time that is required to defend a claim and
damages to reputation. For this reason, it is understandable that physicians concerns about
malpractice risks are pervasive. Carrier et al. (2010), for example, report that more than
60 percent of physicians feel threatened in their day-to-day practice by potential malpractice
litigiation against them.
In theory, liability for medical malpractice should align the interests of physicians and other
healthcare providers with those of patients. Because it punishes the provision of too little
care, liability for medical malpractice should encourage physicians to exert adequate levels
of effort and reduce adverse health outcomes.37 An unintended consequence of the medical
malpractice system is that physicians sometimes provide treatments with social cost above
social benefits because they fear legal repercussions. Such behavior is known as defensive
medicine and has received considerable interest in the literature.38
37Iizuka (2013) provides evidence that higher malpractice pressure indeed reduces the occurrence of pre-
ventable medical complications.
38Doctors have been found to practice defensive medicine by increasing the treatment intensity for patients
with heart attack (Kessler and McClellan 1996, Avraham and Schanzenbach 2015), ordering more imaging
services (Baicker et al. 2007), and prescribing more antibiotics (Panthöfer 2016). The empirical evidence on the
use of Cesarean sections, which are a usual suspect of defensive behavior by physicians, is mixed (compare, for
example, Shurtz 2013 with Currie and MacLeod 2008).
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There is surprisingly little evidence on how the medical malpractice system affects the
time that physicians and other healthcare providers devote to their patients. Given that visit
length is a predictor of malpractice claim frequency (Levinson et al. 1997), one may expect
that physicians adjust the time they spend with patients in response to a change in liability
pressure. Many of the physicians who participated in the surveys of Reynolds et al. (1987)
and Lawthers et al. (1992) report that they increase the time they spend with patients when
they feel pressured. Danzon et al. (1990) mention a positive correlation between office visit
lengths and liability pressure but do not provide any estimates. In this paper, I provide the
first direct evidence on how tort reforms affect the time physicians spend with patients, using
data on physician office visits over a 19-year period.
3.2.2 Tort Reform
The U.S. tort law is organized at the state level. Partially in response to several so-called
malpractice crises, the state tort laws have undergone three major periods of reform (in the
mid 1970s, the mid 1980s, and the early 2000s). The following four reforms are the most
frequently adapted over the period from 1993 to 2011 and the focus of this study.
1. Caps on noneconomic damages: Noneconomic damages are awarded for nonpecuniary
harms – such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of consortium – and ac-
count for about 50% of the typical medical malpractice award (Hyman et al. 2009). Caps
on noneconomic damages unambiguously lower the malpractice pressure that physi-
cians experience: they reduce expected awards and, therefore, lower the incentives for
patients to file a malpractice claim and for trial lawyers – who generally work on a
contigency fee basis – to take up a patient’s case.39
2. Caps on punitive damages: Punitive damages are awarded to plaintiffs, but the inten-
tion behind them is to punish tortfeasors and deter misconduct. Punitive damages are
seldom awarded in medical malpractice cases because they are typically restricted to
the most severe cases of misconduct, which involve intent, actual malice, or gross neg-
ligence. It is therefore not surprising that caps on punitive damages are generally not
associated with jury awards, settlement amounts, and claim frequency in medical mal-
practice cases (see the reviews by Holtz-Eakin 2004 and Mello 2006).
3. Modifications of the collateral-source rule (CSR): The common law CSR prohibits the
admission of evidence that the plaintiff has been compensated from sources other than
the defendant, such as the plaintiff’s health insurance, effectively allowing plaintiffs to
39For empirical evidence on the effect of noneconomic damages caps on various measures of malpractice
pressure, see, for example, Hyman et al. 2009, Avraham 2007, Paik et al. 2013, and Thorpe 2004.
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be compensated twice for the same injury. Modifications of the common law CSR gen-
erally reduce expected awards by admitting evidence that plaintiffs have been compen-
sated by third parties and should therefore, at least theoretically, also reduce incentives
for plaintiffs to file lawsuits. In practice, however, there is no clear association between
measures of malpractice pressure and reforms of the CSR (Holtz-Eakin 2004, Mello
2006).
4. Modifications of the joint-and-several liability (JSL) rule: The common law JSL rule al-
lows plaintiffs to recover damages from multiple defendants collectively or from each
defendant individually, regardless of the shares of liability that are apportioned to the
defendants. Modifications of the common law JSL rule generally restrict the way in
which plaintiffs can sue the involved parties in a multi-party malpractice case. Currie
and MacLeod (2008) argue that such modifications put more liability pressure on physi-
cians because they align more closely the risk of liability with the physician’s level of
care. However, Currie and MacLeod also mention that JSL reforms lower the incentives
for patients to initiate a malpractice claim. On balance, it is not clear – neither theoreti-
cally nor in practice – whether modifications of the JSL rule lead to doctors experiencing
more or less malpractice pressure.
3.3 Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey.
NAMCS is a nationally representative survey of visits to non-federal employed office-based
physicians in the U.S., excluding anesthesiologists, pathologists, and radiologists. Each of
the about 1,200 physicians who participate annually in the survey is randomly assigned to
reporting period of one week. During this week, data are collected for a systematic random
sample of about 25 patients. Physicians and patients may participate in multiple survey years,
but it is not possible to identify longitudinal linkages. For each patient visit, the NAMCS
records hold the patient’s symptoms, the physician’s diagnosis according to the ICD-9-CM,
treatments and medications ordered or provided, and the duration of the visit (top-coded at
240 minutes).
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample, which consists of all visits with
nonzero duration. Observations with a visit duration of zero minutes (4.3% of all observa-
tions) are not comparable to nonzero duration visits and therefore omitted from the sample.40
The sample period runs from 1993 to 2011, and the sample includes a total of 523,488 visits.
Figure 3.1 shows that there is bunching of the visit duration at round numbers, part of which
may be attributed to measurement error. The mean visit duration is slightly above 20 minutes,
40Visits with a duration of zero minutes correspond to, for example, a nurse giving an inoculation.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD 25% 50% 75% 99% N
Visit duration 20.82 13.80 15 15 25 60 523,436
Age 45.73 24.47 28 48 66 89 523,488
Female 0.57 0.49 523,488
White 0.77 0.42 491,782
Black 0.09 0.29 491,782
Latino 0.10 0.30 491,782
Private insurance 0.53 0.50 506,980
Medicare 0.23 0.42 506,980
Medicaid 0.11 0.32 506,980
MD 0.92 0.28 523,488
MSA 0.86 0.35 523,488
Notes: Table reports descriptive statistics for office visits with nonzero duration.
Percentages indicate percentiles. Age, gender, race, and ethnicity are patient
characteristics. MD indicates whether physician has a Doctor of Medicine (MD)
as opposed to a Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine (DO). MSA indicates whether
practice is located in a MSA.
Figure 3.1: Histogram of visit duration
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Table 3.2: Tort reforms, 1993-2011
Law enacted Law repealed
Cap on non- IL 03/09/95 ND 08/01/95* IL 12/18/97 OH 02/25/98
economic damages MT 10/01/95* OH 01/27/97 OR 07/15/99 WI 07/14/05*
NV 10/01/02* MS 01/01/03* IL 02/04/10* GA 03/22/10*
OK 07/01/03* TX 09/01/03*
GA 02/16/05* SC 07/01/05*
IL 08/24/05* WI 04/06/06*
NC 10/01/11* TN 10/01/11
Joint-and-several IL 03/09/95 WI 05/17/95 IL 12/18/97 OH 02/25/98
liability reform OH 01/27/97 PA 08/18/02 PA 07/26/05
NV 10/01/02* AR 03/25/03
OH 04/09/03 GA 02/16/05
SC 07/01/05 PA 06/28/11
OK 11/01/11
Cap on punitive ND 04/30/93 IN 06/30/95 AL 06/25/93 OH 08/25/98
damages OK 08/25/95 NJ 10/27/95 AR 12/08/11
NC 01/01/96 PA 01/25/97*
OH 01/27/97 AK 08/07/97
AL 06/07/99 MS 01/01/03
AR 03/25/03 ID 07/01/03
MT 10/01/03 OH 01/06/05
MT 06/27/05 TN 10/01/11
Collateral-source WI 05/25/95* OH 02/25/98* KS 04/16/93 KY 01/19/95
rule reform AL 09/22/00 PA 03/20/02* AL 07/12/96 OH 01/27/97*
WV 03/08/03* OK 07/01/03*
Notes: Asterisk indicates that the law applies/applied only to medical malpractice rather than to all
torts.
and 99 percent of the visits last less than one hour. Throughout the sample period, there is
no trend over time in the mean visit duration.
Geographic information in the public-use NAMCS data is limited and restricted to iden-
tifiers indicating census region and MSA status. I obtained access to restricted-use NAMCS
data at the Research Data Center of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Using
this data, I could identify the county and state in which physician practices are located and
assign the corresponding state tort laws – which are based on information from Ronen Avra-
ham’s Database of State Tort Law Reforms (Avraham 2014), the state law data provided in
an appendix to Currie and MacLeod (2008), the American Tort Reform Association, and the
state codes – to the observations. I cover the four reforms discussed earlier and the years
from 1992 to 2012 on a monthly basis, where the years 1992 and 2012 are covered to allow
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for the inclusion of reform lags and leads of up to one year. Following Frakes (2012), I say
that noneconomic damages and punitive damages are capped if a state caps the total amount
of damages that can be awarded. Table 3.2 lists the reforms that have taken place over the
sample period.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy is centered around the state tort reforms that are listed in Table 3.2.
To determine the causal effect of each of the four reforms, I adopt a difference-in-differences
specification, which relies on the assumption that states that adopt a given tort reform would,
if they had not adopted the reform, experience the same trend in the length of office visits as
states that do not adopt the reform. The empirical specification for the length of office visits
is the following:
TIMEMDist = ↵ +  LAWst +  Xist + ✓t +  s + "ist. (3.1)
TIMEMDist is the recorded visit duration, where the subscripts i, s, and t stand for, respec-
tively, a visit, a state, and a year-month combination. LAWst is a vector of dummies that
indicate whether state s imposes a cap on noneconomic damages, a cap on punitive damages,
modifications of the joint-and-several liability rule, and modifications of the collateral-source
rule in period t. Xist is a vector of visit-level controls. In its most basic form, this vector in-
cludes dummies for patient age (<5, 5-17, 18-44, 45-64, 65-79, 80+), patient gender, patient
race and ethnicity (white, black, latino, other), health insurance (private, Medicare, Medicaid,
other), physician degree (MD, DO), physician specialty (fourteen categories), physician age
(<35, 35-54, 55+), physician gender, and practice (MSA, non-MSA). In some regressions, I
additionally control for the patient’s reason for visit following the NCHS reason for visit clas-
sification (forty-three categories) or the physician’s diagnosis based on the first subcategory
of the ICD-9-CM classification (159 categories). ✓t indicates a year-month combination,  s
indicates a state, and "ist is the error term. Following Bertrand et al. (2004), I report standard
errors that are clustered at the state level.
I extend the baseline analysis in two directions. First, I study which doctors and patients
are particularly affected by tort reforms. To this end, I estimate models that include inter-
action terms between the law indicators and variables such as the patient’s type of health
insurance and the physician’s specialty, which have previously been identified as sources of
heterogeneity in the malpractice literature. Second, I conduct a variety of sensitivity analyses
in order to assess whether the results are robust to several potential threats and whether the
identification strategy is valid.
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Table 3.3: Impact of tort reforms on length of office visits
Basic controls and Basic controls and
No controls Basic controls reason for visit physician’s diagnosis
Cap on noneconomic damages -0.55 -0.13 -0.12 -0.19
(0.33) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Joint-and-several liability reform -0.10 -0.57 -0.63 -0.56
(0.76) (0.72) (0.69) (0.70)
Cap on punitive damages 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.15
(0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Collateral-source rule reform -0.62 -0.47 -0.56 -0.47
(0.44) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53)
R2 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.17
N 523,488 462,787 457,533 456,609
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (3.1). Standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the state level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
3.5 Results
Table 3.3 shows how the four tort reforms under study affect the length of office visits. None
of the reform effects is statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level in the baseline
model (Column 2), suggesting that tort reforms do not affect how much time physicians de-
vote to their patients. Controlling for the patient’s reason for visit or the physician’s diagnosis
increases the predictive power of the regression model but does not result in statistically sig-
nificant reform effects. Similarly, not controlling for age, gender, and the other basic controls
listed in Section 3.4 leads to a drop in the R-squared of the regression but does not change the
fact that none of the tort reforms has a statistically significant effect on the duration of office
visits at conventional levels of confidence. Across the four models, the coefficient estimates
suggest that tort reforms do not change the length of office visits by more than half a minute
(2.5% of the average visit length). The 95-percent confidence intervals exclude the possibility
that any of the four tort reforms changes visit durations by more than two minutes (10% of
the average visit length). In sum, Table 3.3 presents evidence suggesting that tort reforms
do not affect the length of office visits in U.S. ambulatory care, both in statistical terms and
judging from the magnitude of the coefficients.
But what if tort reforms affect only certain patients or physicians? The previous results re-
semble average effects across all physicians and patients, which may not tell the whole story.
For example, the malpractice literature has highlighted that doctors are more sensitive about
Medicaid and uninsured patients, and that different physician specialties are confronted with
substantially different odds of malpractice lawsuits. Tables 3.4 demonstrates that health in-
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Table 3.4: Interaction between tort reforms and patient’s type of health insurance
Law Law ⇥ Private Law ⇥ Medicare Law ⇥ Medicaid Law ⇥ Other
Cap on noneconomic damages -0.21 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.08
(0.32) — (0.19) (0.21) (0.36)
Joint-and-several liability reform -0.56 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.19
(0.72) — (0.20) (0.21) (0.38)
Cap on punitive damages 0.28 0.00 -0.37* -0.03 -0.62
(0.49) — (0.19) (0.26) (0.40)
Collateral-source rule reform -0.58 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.69*
(0.56) — (0.21) (0.24) (0.35)
R2 0.15
N 462,787
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (3.1) augmented for interaction terms between
indicators of the laws and the patient’s type of health insurance. The dependent variable is the length of office
visits. The reference category consists of the privately insured patients. Standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the state level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
surance status does not interact with the four tort reforms considered in this paper. Out of
the twelve interaction terms in Table 3.4, two are significant at the 90-percent level of confi-
dence. However, in both cases, the coefficient on the interaction term and the coefficient on
the law itself sum up to zero, suggesting that the law does not have a statistically significant
impact on the subgroup. Table 3.5 paints a similar picture but with respect to physician spe-
cialties. Surgeons, gynecologists, and obstetricians, who face the highest odds of malpractice
lawsuits, do not consistently depart in their response to tort reforms from all other special-
ties.41 Likewise, physicians in low-risk specialties such as general practice and pediatrics do
not react differently to tort reforms in comparison to their peers. The same applies to most
other observable patient and physician characteristics, including age, gender, medical degree
(MD/DO), practice type (solo/group), and type of healthcare (primary care/specialist care).42
As with any difference-in-differences strategy, the previous results hinge on the assumption
that the interventions – the four tort reforms – are exogenous and orthogonal to trends in
the outcome variable in the treatment and control states. Table 3.6 presents the results of
four different models aimed at testing the identifying assumption. The first model includes
indicators that equal one in the six months before the tort reforms are implemented. As
41However, we can notice that orthopedic surgeons do statistically significantly increase the length of office
visits after caps on punitive damages. For general surgeons and reforms of the JSL rule, we observe a statistically
different response from all other specialties, but the interaction term and the coefficient on the JSL rule itself
roughly sum up to zero, suggesting that general surgeons do not respond to JSL reforms.
42Results are available upon request.
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Table 3.6: Tests for legislative endogeneity
Excluding reforms
Six-month lead Only reforms specific to medical State-specific
of reforms turning off malpractice time trends
Cap on noneconomic damages -0.64 -0.05 0.15 0.15
(0.77) (0.31) (0.55) (0.63)
Joint-and-several liability reform -0.55 -0.27 -0.70 0.59
(0.61) (0.47) (0.67) (0.67)
Cap on punitive damages 1.45 -0.19 0.24 -0.41
(0.89) (0.66) (0.61) (0.47)
Collateral-source rule reform 2.04 1.71** -1.75* -1.21**
(1.40) (0.78) (1.02) (0.53)
R2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14
N 462,787 462,787 462,787 482,452
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (3.1). Column 1 reports coefficients on
dummies that equal one in the six months before the tort reforms are enacted. Column 2 reports
coefficients on dummies that equal one as long as the tort reforms have been turned off. Column 3
reports coefficients on tort reform indicators that are not affected by reforms that are specific to med-
ical malpractice. Column 4 reports coefficients on tort reform indicators from a model that includes
state-specific time trends and visits with zero duration. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
state level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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we can see, states that adopt tort reforms and states that do not adopt tort reforms do not
feature statistically different office visit lengths in the six months before the introduction of the
reforms. The second model includes only tort reforms that are turned off, which include, for
example, reforms where a damages cap is repealed. The rationale behind this second model is
that tort reforms are almost exclusively turned off because the respective state supreme court
ruled that the reform violated the state constitution. For this reason, tort reforms that are
being turned off are plausibly exogenous to trends in medical care. As we can see, whether
we include all reforms or only reforms that are turned off makes no difference for both kinds
of caps on damages and reforms of the JSL rule. However, we observe a statistically significant
and positive effect of CSR reform repeals on visit durations. The third model includes only tort
reforms that apply not only to medical malpractice cases but also to product liability cases,
auto accidents, etc. These reforms are arguably less susceptible to legislative endogeneity
than reforms that are specifically aimed at medical malpractice cases. The results of the third
model mirror those of the second one: caps on noneconomic and punitive damages and JSL
reforms have no impact on the length of office visits but CSR reforms reduce the length of
office visits.43 The fourth and final test of legislative endogeneity incorporates state-specific
linear time trends in the regression model. After controlling for state-specific time trends, CSR
reforms reduce the length of office visits and the three remaining reforms continue to have
no statistically significant impact. Taken together, the four tests of legislative endogeneity
suggest that the identifying assumption is valid for damages caps and reforms of the JSL
rule, but that it may not hold for CSR reforms. As discussed before, CSR reforms should,
at least theoretically, lead to a reduction in malpractice pressure. Physician therefore act in
accordance with economic incentives if they reduce visit durations after CSR reforms. Why
physicians would only react to CSR reforms and not to other liability-reducing tort reforms,
such as caps on noneconomic damages, is not clear.
Table 3.7 addresses several threats that could affect the empirical findings. One such
threat is the simultaneous passing of tort reforms. If states adopt several tort reforms at once,
which some states do (compare Table 3.2), it may be hard to separately estimate the effect
of each the reforms. To address this issue, I have estimated four separate models, one for
each of the reforms. The results of these four models, which are shown in Column 1, do not
differ markedly from the baseline model. I have also collapsed the two indicators for caps
on noneconomic damages and caps on punitive damages into one indicator for any kind of
damages caps. This composite indicator has no statistically significant impact on the length of
office visits either. Another threat concerns the bunching in the visit duration at round num-
bers, which we have observed in Figure 3.1. While doctor visits are frequently scheduled to
last for fifteen (or ten or twenty) minutes, the actual visit duration is perhaps more uniformly
43To some extent, this result could be anticipated as the CSR reforms that are being turned off and the CSR
reforms that are not specific to medical malpractice cases are almost congruent (compare Table 3.2).
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Table 3.7: Robustness checks
Each reform Any kind Binary dependent Excluding Excluding Including
separately of cap variable imputed visits >60 min 0-min visits
Cap on non- -0.30 0.01 -0.38 -0.02 0.06
economic damages (0.33) (0.01) (0.36) (0.27) (0.37)
Joint-and-several -0.64 (0.02) -0.71 -0.61 -0.42
liability reform (0.62) (0.03) (0.79) (0.79) (0.83)
Cap on punitive -0.15 -0.00 -0.02 0.11 0.11
damages (0.37) (0.03) (0.51) (0.48) (0.46)
Collateral-source -0.53 0.02 -0.83 -0.48 -0.61
rule reform (0.40) (0.02) (0.55) (0.54) (0.52)
Any cap -0.03
(0.36)
R2 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.14
N 462,787 462,787 366,211 458,730 482,452
Notes: Table reports results from OLS estimation of equation (3.1). Column 1 reports results from four
different regressions, where all laws other than the one corresponding to the row name are excluded from
the regression model. Column 2 reports from a model that includes only one law dummy, which indicates
any kind of damages caps. In Column 3, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the visit
lasted longer than 15 minutes. Column 4 excludes observations with imputed values. Column 5 excludes
visits lasting longer than one hour. Column 6 includes visits with zero duration. Standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the state level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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distributed than the recorded visit duration, which may suffer from measurement error. How-
ever, if this measurement error is not correlated with the passing of tort reforms, which seems
likely, then it poses no threat to the consistent estimation of the tort reform effects but leads
to inflated standard errors. Given what we have concluded about the magnitude of the coef-
ficient estimates, it appears unlikely that inflated standard errors due to measurement error
would prevent us from detecting significant effects of tort reforms. Moreover, none of the
four tort reforms has a statistically significant impact on an alternative, binary dependent
variable, which equals one if one if the office visit lasted longer than 15 minutes (the median
visit length) and which should, to some extent, be less affected by measurement error. The
models corresponding to Columns 4 to 6 in Table 3.7 deal with imputed values,44 visits that
last longer than one hour, and visits with zero duration. None of these issues seems to affect
the conclusion that tort reforms have no impact on the duration of office visits.
3.6 Discussion
In this section, I discuss several potential explanations for why physicians would not adjust
the length of office visits in response to tort reforms. One of these explanations could be that
physicians do not notice, or pay only little attention, to tort reforms and their impact on the li-
ability climate in the state. While Carrier et al. (2010) find that physicians’ fear of malpractice
is only weakly correlated with the prevailing malpractice laws, this does not necessarily mean
that tort reforms do not change physicians’ perception of malpractice pressure. Moreover, the
argument that physicians do not care about tort reforms seems to be at odds with numerous
studies that find an effect of tort reforms on treatment and medication choices (see, for exam-
ple, Kessler and McClellan 1996 and Currie and MacLeod 2008). All in all, it seems unlikely
that physicians do not take tort reforms into account.
It could also be that physicians adjust the length of office visits in response to tort reforms
for different patients differently. Plausibly, physicians want to spend more time with high-risk
patients after an increase in liability pressure. To make up for the increased time spent on
high-risk patients, physicians may handle low-risk patients more quickly, leaving the average
visit length unchanged. Tort reforms could also lead to changes in the patient mix that physi-
cians treat. If physicians are less willing to take up high-risk patients after an increase in
liability pressure, we may find no change in visit durations but for a patient population that is
significantly healthier after the reform. This would suggest that physicians, after an increase
in liability pressure, spend more time on patients with the same risk profile. Similarly, physi-
cians could also adjust the total time spent on a given patient by scheduling more (or less, for
that matter) visits for this patient and we would not observe such behavior in the data. I will
44The following variables are imputed by the NCHS if the information is missing on the patient record form:
age, ethnicity, race, gender, time spent with physician, visit date.
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explore these explanations in more detail in future research.
Two alternative explanations for the absence of an effect of tort reforms on office visit
durations are related to the legal burden of proof of medical malpractice. As Frakes and Jena
(2016) have pointed out, tort reforms affect physicians in different areas of a state differently,
because of varying local standards, which could imply that the effects of tort reform cancel
out at the state level. However, it seems unlikely that physicians in the same state spend
vastly different amounts of time on patients, which would give rise to varying local standards.
Alternatively, it could be that the time spend with patients is not always verifiable in court,
as opposed to the use of procedures and administration of medication, which would lead
physicians to adjust their behavior only along the latter margins. However, even if the visit
duration is not verifiable in court, spending more time with patients should lead to a more
precise diagnosis, which would lower the malpractice pressure on physicians. Hence, both of
these explanations hardly explain the absence of an effect.
One of the most likely explanations for the absence of an effect of tort reforms on the
length of office visits is that physicians are constrained in their time allocation. Two con-
straints that come to mind are ethical and financial constraints. With regard to the former,
it is clear that physicians in U.S. ambulatory care are generally short on time when treating
patients (Linzer et al. 2000) and may, as a matter of fact, already be at the lower bound of
what they think is ethically acceptable care. On the other hand, physicians are pressed to earn
money, and spending more time with patients generally does not increase a physician’s rev-
enues, as opposed to ordering more tests and procedures. This may explain why physicians
do not want to increase the time per visit. If both of these constraints are binding, physicians
are effectively unable to adjust the length of office visits, be it in response to tort reforms or
any other changes.
3.7 Conclusion
What is the impact of tort reforms on the practice of medicine? Much of the literature on
tort reforms has focused on their impact on the use of procedures and treatments, such as
Caesarean sections, coronary artery bypass grafting, imaging services, and prescription drugs.
While the conclusions vary on a case-by-case basis, many papers have found that tort reforms
influence physicians’ decisions. In contrast to these findings, I show in this paper that tort
reforms, with the possible exception of reforms of the collateral-source rule, do not affect
how much time physicians spend with patients. Among the most likely explanations for this
finding are ethical and financial constraints that deter physicians from adjusting the length of
office visits.
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